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HEDGING AND WAGERING ON PRODUCE
EXCHANGES
EDWIN W. PATTERSON0
TRADING on produce exchanges has been the subject of numerous
public and private investigations.2 Facts are voluminous. Opin-
ions are divergent. The charge that organized exchanges are
parasites on the body politic is met by the counter-charge that
they perform useful functions in the marketing of certain agri-
cultural commodities. 2  Most arguments in favor of the present
system of trading, especially the trading in "futures" (which
is the storm centre of the controversy), revolve around the
necessity of having a market available for hedging. Without
assuming ,that this is the only possible justification for the con-
tinuance of futures trading,3 one may safely say that it is the
* Professor of Law, Columbia University; author of THE INSURANCE
COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED STATES (1927). The author is indebted to
B. B. Hadfield, Jr., L.L.B. Columbia, 1930, for valuable aid in gathering
materials for this article.
3 'REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMIzSSION ON THE GRAIN TRADE (1920-
1926) Vols. 1-7 (cited GRAIN TRADE); REPOrrr OF THE FEDEmAL TRADE
COaMISSION ON METHODS AND OPERATIONS OF GRAIN EXPORTEiRS (1922-1923)
Vols. 1-2 (cited GRAIN EXPORTERS); HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON
AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY ON S. 454 (A Bill to Prevent the Sale of Cot-
ton and Grain in Future Markets, U. S. Senate, 69th Cong. 1st sess. 1926)
1-390 (cited HEARINGS ON S. 454), also printed in HEARINGS OF CoMrIITTEE
ON AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY (Gov't Printing Office, 1926) vol. 5, 1-193;
GEORGE W. HOFFIAN, HEDGING BY DEALING IN GRAIN FuTuIms (1925),
with bibliography of earlier literature, at 131 ct scq.; JAMES E. BoYLxE,
SPECULATION AND THE CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE (1920); H. C. EMRY,
SPECULATION ON THE STOCK AND PRODUCE EXCHANGES (1896); THE CosT
OF TRADING IN WHEAT FUTURES, WHEAT STUDIES OF THE FOOD RESEAXRCH
INSTITUTE OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY (1926) Vol. 2, No. 3. This list is not.
exhaustive. Stock exchange trading is here excluded from consideration.
2 Besides the grain and cotton exchanges, herein discussed, there are
organized exchanges in sugar, rice, jute, rubber, etc.
3 Even apart from hedging, grain exchanges furnish a public register
of prices open to all who deal in grain (Grain Futures Act, 42 STAT. 998,
1001 (1922), 7 U. S. C. § 6 (1926) ; HEARINGS ON S. 454, 264, quoting the
Stanford study), and probably tend to prevent violent fluctuations in pric-
(ibid. 215; BOYLE, op. cit, supra note 1, at 219).
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chief one. If a way could be found to preserve present hedging
facilities and yet abolish wagering or excessive speculation, leg-
islators would probably be glad to enact appropriate legisla-
tion.4 Yet no method has been found, and it is frequently
assumed that a practical separation of hedging and wagering
is impossible5
The present article deals with a narrow phase of the prob-
lem, namely, the possibility of distinguishing wagering from
hedging in civil actions where illegality is pleaded as a defense
or as the basis of a cause of action. Attempts to supervise and
curtail futures trading by federal legislation c have not super-
seded the statutes, found in many states, which prohibit the
making of contracts for future delivery where there is no inten-
tion to deliver or to accept delivery.7 Direct penalties are com-
monly attached to these statutes, but, if one may judge by the
reported cases on appeal, indirect penalties, such as denial of
4 Senator Norris, iii the hearings on S. 454, asked if such a separation
-were possible. HEARINGS ON S. 454, 15.
5 Such was the opinion of two Secretaries of Agriculture, Wallace and
Jardine. HEARINGS ON S; 454, 8, 12.
6The Grain Futures Act, 42 STAT. 998 (1922), 7 U. S. C. § 1 (1926),
is a regulatory measure. Section 6 prohibits futures transactions (in in-
terstate commerce) in grain unless the seller is a grower or actual owner
of the grain, or the contract is made by or through a member of a board
of trade approved on certain conditions, by the Secretary of Agriculture
as a "contract market." The constitutionality of this section was questioned,
but not determined, in Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1, 43 Sup.
Ct. 470 (1923). United States Cotton Futures Act, 39 STAT. 476 (1916), 26
U. S. C. § 731 (1926), purports to be a revenue measure. It imposes a pro-
hibitive tax (two cents per pound) on futures contracts made on a
cotton exchange unless the contract complies with certain requirements, one
of which is that the contract must provide that delivery of the cotton shall
not be effected by "set-off" or "ring settlement," but only by the actual
transfer of the specified cotton mentioned in the contract. § 741 (4).
7 Typically, state statutes are broad enough to invalidate futures trans.
actions made within the state though carried out by trades made in another
state. See infra notes 42 and 60. The Cotton Futures Act, as a revenue
measure, presumably does not supersede this state legislation. The effect
of the Grain Futures Act will depend upon whether Congress intended to
assume exclusive control of the regulation of grain exchanges as instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce. Section 5 contains a broad declaration
of the necessity of regulation for the protection of interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court of Kansas, in an able opinion by Burch, J., has hold
that the federal law supersedes the direct penal provisions of the Kansas
statute, as applied to a commission merchant taking orders for trades on
exchanges approved by the Secretary of Agriculture. State ex rel. Burnett
v. Rosenbaum Grain Co., 115 Kan. 40, 222 Pac. 80 (1924). Cf. Hoyt v.
Wickham, 25 F. (2d) 777 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928). The federal law may
even supersede state laws as to trades (on approved grain exchanges) con-
summated wholly within state lines. The question is too involved for further
elaboration here. At all events, the present discussion may throw some
light on the meaning and usefulness of the "mutual intention" test.
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recovery on the contract, are much more frequently invoked.
Whatever may be said of this type of deterrent, as long as these
statutes continue to be the subject of civil litigation the problem
of their interpretation will continue to be important. More-
over, the present attempt to discover their implications and their
applications will, it is hoped, throw some light upon the theory
of wagering ag:eements.
Wagering agreements have long given trouble to courts and
legislators. The English courts, while enforcing wagers on trivial
events with some reluctance," seized upon slight pretexts as a
basis for denying recovery on wagers tending to promote crime
or immorality.9 Yet they were unwilling to mount the "unruly
horse" of public policy "I and declare all wagering agreements
unenforceable. The legislature was equally cautious. Until 1845
Parliament prohibited, with varying degrees of legal sanction,
certain specific types of wagering institutions; 11 then a sweep-
ing prohibition against wagering transactions was enacted .'
Certainly the earlier legislation, aimed at specific undesirable
institutions, was much easier to apply than the abstract pro-
hibition of wagering, which leaves for judicial determination
basic questions of social and economic policy. It may be noted
also, for future reference, that the sanctions of English legisla-
tion were never so severe nor so broad in scope as to indicate a
determined purpose to stamp out wagering agreements.
8 E. g., March v. Pigot, 5 Burr. 2802 (1771) (wager on survivorship of
fathers of the wagerers) ; Hussey v. Crickitt, 3 Camp. 108 (1811) (wager
on who was older). But see Lord Ellenborough's indignant refusal to set-
tie a wager between two attorneys on a question of law. Henkin v. Gerss,
2 Camp. 408 (1810).
9 E. g., Gilbert v. Sykes, 16 East 150 (1812) (wager on life of Napoleon
I); Da Costa v. Jones, 2 Cowp. 729 (1778) (wager on the sex of a certain
individual).
10 "1, for one, protest, as my Lord has done, against arguing too strongly
upon public policy;-it is a very unruly horse, and when once you get
astride it you never know where it will carry you." Burrough, J., in
Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229, 252 (1824). See also HOLLAND, Ju nS-
PRUDENcE (10th ed. 1906) 268; 2 ELY, PROPRTY AND Coxner WN THEMR
RELATION TO THE DIsmIBuTION OF WEALTH (1914) 570; 3 WmLLsToN, CON-
TRACTS (1920) §1667.
1i E. g., 33 HEN. VIII, c- 9 (1541-2) (prohibiting gaming houses at which
certain games were played); 16 CA. II, c. 7 (1664) (winning of more than
£100 at play unlawful; treble forfeiture); 10 WM. III, c. 23 (1698) (lot-
teries declared public nuisances).
'22The Gaming Act, 8 and 9 ViC., c. 109 (1845), superseding nearly all
prior legislation, declared contracts "by way of gaming or wagering" void.
Subscriptions to prizes for the winners of games, sports, etc., however,
were declared lawful. The loser was not allowed to recover his stake.
Gaming Act, 1922, 12 and 13 GEo. V, c. 19, repealing an earlier provision
(Gaming "Act, 1835, 5 and 6 Wm. IV, c. 41) which has numerous counter-
parts in American legislation.
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Throughout most of the United States no legislation was
needed to make wagering agreements unenforceable. Judges,
inspired (one may conjecture) by Puritan ideas of vice and by
pioneer notions of useful industry, declared wagering trans-
actions, in general, contrary to public policy. Legislation has
filled in portions of this broad outline of social policy by pro-
hibiting, with varying penalties, more clearly defined institu-
tional practices (various types of games or gambling apparatus,
lotteries, book-making at horseraces, etc.) ; and enforcement of-
ficials have further discriminated between different ways of
satisfying the gambling appetite. One should not be surprised,
then, if the law in action turns out to be a compromise with
the devil.
In order to determine the possibility of separating hedging
from wagering in civil litigation one must investigate first, the
institutional practices embraced° under the term hedging, and
their social utility; secondly, the implications of the legal con-
ception of wagering, especially the relation of the "intention"
test to institutional behavior; finally, methods of proving a
"wager." Judicial decisions directly involving hedging are too
few, too divergent, and too obscurely reasoned, to furnish ade-
quate criteria.
I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE HEDGING TRANSACTION
For convenience discussion will be confined chiefly to the grain
trade, since the thorough investigation made by the Federal
Trade Commission in 1919-1920 renders available a large amount
of impartially collected data. The definition of hedging as given
by the Commission is:
"Hedging in grain-trade practice may be defined as a combi-
nation of transactions in cash grain, and in futures such that a
purchase of the former is accompanied by the sale of the latter
in corresponding quantity, and vice versa. Hedging ordinarily
involves fourfold transactions-an initial purchase and an initial
sale, one of the cash grain, and the other of the futures, and the
opposite closing transactions in each. By means of hedging, a
loss on the cash grain will presumably be offset by a gain on the
futures and vice versa." 13
"Cash grain" does not refer to the time of payment (hence is
not used in contradistinction to "credit grain") but to specific
grain actually in the seller's possession, or to a designated quan-
13 (1926) 7 GRAiN TRADE 33. For greater clarity, the process may be
described as follows: (1) Initial purchase of cash grain, (2) initial sale
of "futures," (3) subsequent sale of cash grain, closing out the cash trans-
action, (4) purchases of futures, closing out the futures transaction. The
term "hedging" is here used to describe a hedge against a "legitimate"
interest, and not a hedge against a wager.
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tity and grade "to arrive" in the near future. 4 On the other
hand, a sale of "futures" is an agreement to sell grain to be de-
livered on any day during a designated month the seller may
choose. Certain months are commonly so designated by cus-
tom of the grain exchanges-e. g., on the Chicago Board of Trade,
September, December, Mlay and July.
To illustrate: A, the proprietor of a grain elevator at a small
town in North Dakota, on October 1 purchases 1,000 bushels of
wheat from farmers and has it in his bins. He then contracts
through an exchange member to sell to B 1,000 bushels of wheat
for delivery in December on the Minneapolis exchange at a
named price conforming to the "December wheat" price current
on the day of sale. A's purpose in making this futures contract
is to indemnify himself against a decline in the price of wheat,
by reason whereof he will receive less for his "cash" grain, which
he sells later, than he would have received by selling it at once.
A's assumption is that his loss on his cash grain, due to price
decline, will be offset by his gain on his futures sale, due to price
decline. Instead of holding his "cash" grain until December and
then delivering it to B in performance of his futures sale, before
December A sells his "cash" wheat to others, either directly to
a miller, exporter, or other dealer, or indirectly through a broker
or commission fim.15 At the same time A orders his broker to
"buy" a like quantity of December wheat for the purpose of
closing out his futures sale. This order is executed on the
exchange, possibly with B as seller, but almost certainly with C,
another person, as seller. If the price of December wheat, on
the exchange, has declined, A's futures purchase is made at a
lower price than was his earlier futures sale, and this difference,
it is assumed, will compensate him for the loss incurred in sell-
ing his "cash" wheat at a lower price than he paid for it.
Now A might wait until the end of December, take delivery
on his wheat from C, and make delivery on his wheat to B. But
A knows this would be a wasteful process if the grain were
actually hauled about, and a tedious one even if only warehouse
receipts were exchanged. The organized exchange has a more
economical and sophisticated method of "settling" these trans-
actions. This method involves merely the brokers who nego-
'4 (1920) 2 Ibid. 329. The "to-arrive" purchase is classed with "cash
grain" rather than with "futures." RUIES OF THE CHICAGO BoARD OF
TRADR (1930) 7; (1923) 2 GRAIN EXPORTERS 8.
5 While the terms "commission house," "broker" and "member of an
exchange" are by no means synonympus, the term "broker" will be used
in this article to refer to all three, that is, to an agent in futures trading
who is a member of, or deals through a member of, an organized exchange.
See (1920) 2 GRAIN TRADE 331. Strictly speaking, a broker is one who




tiated for A, B and C. Either by direct set-off between brokers,
or by "ringing-out" (a process of substituting B for A in the A-C
contract) or by a clearing-house which is substituted as buyer to
the seller and as seller to the buyer, sales and purchases will be
cancelled off with payments of differences in price,1 6 and A's
broker will pay him the net profit (or collect the loss) on the two
"futures" contracts. This net profit or loss will, theoretically,
partly offset the loss or profit on the "cash" transactions, and
leave A his "buyer's margin," or "merchandising profit," i.e., the
difference between the local and the Minneapolis price, less ex-
penses of operation, including the cost of hedging.17
"Hedging" is (or was) used by ninety per cent of the local
elevators in North Dakota, and in a lesser degree by local eleva-
tors in other states.18 The larger flour mills use "hedging"
transactions in two ways. Sometimes the miller sells futures in
order to hedge cash grain which he has on hand for manu-
facture into flour. More frequently he contracts to deliver flour
in the future, on the basis of the present price of wheat futures,
and then buys wheat futures; as he buys in his "cash" wheat
for milling, he sells a corresponding quantity of futures. An
increase in the price of wheat will make his flour contract less
profitable but will make his futures contract more profitable,
so that, if the plan works well, he will come out with his manu-
facturing profit on the flour.19 Hedging is also used by grain
exporters to cover their commitments to foreign purchasers.
Hedgers rarely, if ever, "expect" to make or take delivery on
their futures contracts.20  Millers, in particular, are unwilling
10 This statement is to be qualified by the fact that actual delivery of
grain takes place on a small percentage of futures transactions which are
"open," i. e., cannot be closed out because there are no counter-transactions
to cancel them. It is estimated that only a small fraction of one per cent
of the transactions on the Chicago Board of Trade are consummated by
actual delivery. (1923) 2 GRAIN ExPoRTERs 8.
17 The way in which "hedging" works to A's advantage is shown by a
theoretical illustration in (1920) 1 GRAIN TRADE 208 et. seq. See also
HEARINGS ON S. 454, 19.
18 (1926) 7 GRAIN TRADE 52. About 50 per cent of the country elevators
reporting to the Commission customarily hedged their grain purchases.
(1920) 1 ibid. 213.
19 (1926) 7 ibid. 43....
20 "Hedging as such- does not involve an expectation to deliver the grain on
the future contract, though the hedger of purchased grain is presumably
in a better position to make actual delivery than the mere speculator, and
delivery on hedges does at times occur." (1926) 7 ibid. 34. "The theory
of hedging does not involve actual delivery, and in practice the per cent
of deliveries is small. Hedges are placed for the purpose of offsetting
losses from fluctuations in the price of grain between the time of purchase
and sale. If the cash grain is not sold [by the dealer who has sold futures]
.the hedge is usually transferred to a more remote future. Hedging may
be done where it would be impossible or impracticable, because of the loca-
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to take delivery because of the uncertainty of getting the kind
of grain they want for manufacture into flour.21 The whole pur-
pose and usefulness of hedging depends upon the fact that it
affords, under favorable conditions of the market, an indemnity
in money for losses which the "cash grain" dealer or the miller
suffers by reason of the swing in market prices. If a dealer
sells futures with the expectation of making delivery of the
grain, he is not hedging in the accepted sense of that term.2
But do not the rules of organized exchanges provide that all
contracts are made in "contemplation" of actual delivery, and
that mere "trading in differences" is prohibited? Does not one
who orders a member of such an exchange to sell futures on the
exchange "intend" to conform to those rules, if called upon,
hence "intend" to make delivery if necessary, even though he
confidently expects that this will rarely happen? 3 Without
stopping now over this subtle distinction, one may point out that
the exchange rules (as to delivery) apply only to transactions
between members of the exchange. - - After the process of settle-
tion of the grain or because of its quality, to deliver on the future contract
the actual grain hedged." Ibid. 35. See also (1920) 5 ibid. 174. Terminal
elevators in the Chicago market, however, make delivery under their hedg-
ing sales of futures if no satisfactory "cash" buyer can be found. (1920)
5 ibid. 185.
21 (1920) 5 ibid. 185. The Commission expected, however, that the estab-
lishment of Federal grades of grain would make quality more uniform
and thus make millers feel more sure of getting sound milling wheat
on a futures delivery.
22 The dealer who has purchased "cash" grain may at once sell "to arrive"
and thus protect himself against a market decline during the interval
between his purchase and his delivery to his purchaser; but this is regarded
as a "substitute for hedging." (1926) 7 ibid. 61.
23 Here we anticipate the distinction drawn by Mr. Justice Holmes in
Board of Trade of Chicago v. Kinsey Co., 198 U. S. 236, 25 Sup. CL 637
(1905), discussed infra note 85. Default by a member of the exchange
entails severer consequences than are imposed by the judicial rules of dam-
ages, ranging from a liquidated damage, to expulsion and forfeiture of
membership for wilful default in the performance of an exchange contract.
RULES OF THE CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE (1930) §§ 130, 141, 573. The
Chicago Board of Trade rule once required the seller to pay not less than
five per cent of the value of the commodity as liquidated damages. The
St. Louis rules impose a penalty of five cents per bushel (of wheat) upon
the buyer who refuses to take delivery. (1920) 2 GRAIN TRADE 260-264.24 While some grain exchanges purport to "blacklis' non-members who
have "failed to comply with any contract, verbal or written, in relation to
a transaction had through or with any member of this association," there
is no evidence that these rules are effective sanctions, or that they are
applicable to compel actual delivery. (1920) 2 GRAIN TRADE 216-218. "The
Cwstomer Not Necessarily Involved in Delivery. ... The broker in these
matters is not an agent of his principal in any sense that permits the
shifting of responsibility but is completely substituted for him as re-
gards obligations to other members under future contracts." 5 ibid. 182.
The "legal rights" of members against each other are rarely the subject
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ment between member and member has been completed, some
"open" (uncancelled by clearing-house, set-off or ringing out)
trades will be left on the books. In settlement of these, ware-
house receipts will be tendered by member (or by the clearing
house) to member. The member who tenders a receipt prac-
tically always gets it (eventually by endorsement, if not im-
mediately) from a terminal elevator.25  The customer who sells
"short" does not expect to and cannot be compelled to make
delivery; he is charged with the price differential. As to the
buying end, the member who "stops" a delivery (i.e., who is
long, receives a delivery notice, and cannot pass it on) ordi-
narily makes delivery to the customer whose purchase is oldest
among the uncancelled trades on his books, except that a cus-
tomer who wants actual delivery may, if the others do not, be
preferred.26 The customer is practically never "compelled" or
"required" to take delivery. Hence, it is difficult to see in what
sense a customer-hedger ever "intends" to make or take de-
livery. This conclusion will be connected further on' with the
legal rulings on wagering contracts.
One further aspect of hedging practice should be mentioned.
The illustrations given above are examples of "strict rule" hedg-
ing, i.e., the hedging transactions are made and closed simul-
taneously with the making, and closing, of the cash transactions.
Allowing for a few hours delay as negligible, one may say that
"strict hedging" is common among many line and terminal eleva-
tors of the Northwest. 27 Yet most hedgers do not keep their
interests strictly hedged. The hedger may wait, after buying
cash grain, for a better futures market; or he may carry his
futures sale, i.e., not "close it out" by a corresponding purchase,
after the cash grain has been sold. In this way a futures con-
tract held for thirty or forty days-which is apparently the
average length of time during which such a contract is left
"open" 2 -- may serve as a hedge against several purchases of
cash grain if the latter are quickly sold.
of litigation; the important relations so far as litigation is concerned are
those between the broker (member) and his customer. Practically all the
reported cases involve these relations.
25 "As a matter of fact, however, an ordinary customer would never
think of obtaining possession of a warehouse receipt and turning it in to
his broker in satisfaction of a futures contract. As indicated above, prac-
tically all sales upon which delivery is made originate with elevators."
5 ibid. 182.
26 Ibid. 183. A hedger may occasionally want to deliver on his futures
sale, however, because of a squeeze in the market, since a purchase to close
out would boost the price and thus enhance his loss. (1926) 7 ibid. 66.
27 (1926) 7 ibid. 56.
28 Ibid. 39. A table here shows that the "average life" of futures trades
of selected elevators and millers for the years 1914-1917 varied from 22 to
40 days, with an average of 30.
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Departure from strict rule hedging makes it difficult to draw
the line between "hedging" and "speculation." From a legal
point of view two observations may be made. First, it is legally
immaterial that the hedger postpones making his hedge, just so
he has an interest to be protected at the time when the hedge is
made; and it seems likewise immaterial that he carries the hedge
after his legitimate interest has ceased. Secondly, whether a
hedger has "over-hedged" and gone in for "speculation" cannot
be determined with reference to any individual futures trans-
action without taking account of his other trades; it can be de-
termined only by comparing his cash transactions with his net
short or long commitments at the same moment.20 A legal rule
framed in terms of an individual contract must either take
account of such complicated facts or furnish an arbitrary
criterion.
II. "INTENTION" AS THE LEGAL TEST OF VALIDITY
In decisions which turn upon the enforceability of contracts for
the future sale of commodities, the standard test laid down is
the "intention!' or "intentions" of the parties, at the time of
contracting, that actual delivery will or will not be made.0° Why
is "intention," in any sense, significant for the purpose of diter-
mining the validity of such agreements?
A series of type cases will answer:
Case No. 1: In December, 1930, A promises to pay B $1,000
if Grade X wheat for May delivery (seller's option) is sold on
the Chicago Board of Trade at more than $1.10 during March,
1931, in exchange for which B promises to pay A $1,000 if such
wheat is not thus sold. (Assumption: Neither A nor B has
any "interest" in the price of such wheat during March, 1931,
other than the interest, if any, created by this agreement.)
On these facts neither A nor B could, in most jurisdictions in
the United States, successfully maintain an action for breach of
contradt. Because of the implicit assumption that neither A nor
B has an extraneous interest in the price of wheat, the agree-
ment is prima fadie a wager and hence unenforceable. But only
prinm facie or presumptively; the addition of facts showing that
A (or B) has an extraneous interest which would be injured to
2 The net "short" or "long" position of the Washburn-Crosby Co. on
November 30 in each of the years 1913-1921 inclusive is shown in (192G) 7
GRAIN TRADE 55. The positions varied from 30% short to 5.7B long,
the figures being percentages of the total net commitments on both cash
wheat and futures transactions. This gives some idea of the variations
from strict hedging of a prudent large-scale hedger.
3o See cases cited infra notes 43, 47, 67, 69 etc.; WILLISTON, op. cit. supra
note 10, at §§ 1670, 1673. Statutes commonly adopt the "intention" test,
the varieties of -which are discussed further on.
19all
YALE LAW JOURNAL
the extent of at least $1,000 by the happening of the contingency
upon which B was to pay would lead to the conclusion that the
agreement is an enforceable contract of indemnity. The exist-
ence of such additional facts is so highly improbable ," that an
inference, if not a rebuttable presumption, of their non-existence
is proper in judicial proceedings. If, then, the agreement above
recited is "on its face" a wagering agreement, this is only be-
cause, on the basis of experience, a court readily infers that no
such extraneous "interest" exists. Without such an inference
the agreement "on its face" would be equivocal; in short, one
cannot identify an agreement as "wagering" without giving heed
to the situation of the parties extraneous to the conduct which
makes the agreement.
The necessity of looking beyond the terms of the agreement
to its institutional setting is apparent when one considers the
reasons why wagering agreements are condemned as against
public policy. While judges and legal text-writers rarely give
any indication of it, one may conjecture that there are two
types of reasoning which account for judicial and legislative hos-
tility toward wagering agreements.. One is found in the moral
sentiments of the community, or of an important part of it.
The Puritan condemns wagering because it is commonly asso-
ciated with such sinful pastimes as card-playing, horse-racing
and cock-fighting. The pioneer, earning his bread by the sweat
31 Improbable, because if the price of wheat exceeds $1.10 by the smallest
fraction, B wins $1,000; hence it is unlikely that any "legitimate" interest
is protected by such an agreement. Yet not impoesible, for quotations on
the Chicago Board of Trade are usually made in no smaller fractions than
eighths of a cent; hence, if B had previously "sold" 800,000 bushels of grade
X wheat for May delivery, buyer's option as to time, B would stand to
lose $1,000 on the futures. contract if wheat went to $1.101/ at any time
during May and if B's buyer called for delivery at that time. These possi-
bilities shovi that even such a crass wager as Case No. 1 appears on its
face to be, cannot be conclusively labeled as "contrary to public policy"
merely by looking at the words of the agreement.
In this article the term 'cwager" is used to designate an aleatory agree-
ment which does not serve the purpose of indemnifying either party against
injury to an extraneous interest. One type of case which would not fall
strictly within this definition, but which may properly be designated as a
"wagering agreement," would be this: Suppose B, before making the agree-
ment in Case No. 1, had made a wagering agreement to pay C $1,000
if grade X wheat was sold at more than $1.10 during March, 1931. Here
the agreement in Case No. 1 would serve to protect B against loss on the
B-C agreement; but since B's interest under the B-C agreement is not
protected- by the usual legal sanctions, it would not be legally recognized
as an extraneous interest sufficient to take the A-B agreement out of the
class of wagers. Nash-Wright Co. v. Wright, 166 Ill. App. 243 (1910),
contains a valuable discussion of this type of case. The "indemnity con-
tfacts" forrerly authorized by the rules of the Chicago Board of Trade,
(1920) 2 GRAIN TRADE 119, are now no longer authorized. RULES OF THE
CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE (1930) § 42.
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of his brow, is hostile toward one who can gain a living without
toil. In the old-fashioned novel or play, the villain was often a
gambler and the gambler was always a villain. Accepting this
moral sentiment as a sufficient justification for official condemna-
tion, one can see that a particular agreement cannot be identified
as coming under the ban, without having regard to other facts
than the agreement itself, i.e., the particular individual's habit
or practice of gaining a livelihood by such transactions, and the
institutional setting.
The second type of reasoning has to do with "anti-social" con-
sequences. To devote capital and human energy to activity
which is not productive, is socially wasteful.2 Under a marginal
utility theory of value, the gain of the winner of a wager is of
less value than the loss of the loser (assuming equal wealth at
the outset), and there is thus a net economic loss without any
gain to society. 3 The judicial (or legislative-judicial) concep-
tion of wagering has sprung, it would seem, from a narrow
conception of productive activity; only those who store, trans-
port or convert wheat, for instance, are regarded as useful in
the production process. It fits the conditions of a simple
economic society where the farmer and the local miller are easily
differentiated from the professional gambler. To these theoreti-
cal postulates may be added the observed consequences of vari-
ous types of wagering when carried on by a considerable por-
tion of the population. Idleness, improvident extravagance, im-
poverishment of losers and their dependents, dissipation, fraud,
fighting and suicide are some of the horrors which have been,
with a fair degree of truth, depicted as following in the wake
32KoHLER, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (Albrecht's trans. 1914) 61; "If two
merchants agree that, according to the state of the prices in the exchange,
the one must pay the other, this is simply a game that brings about no
actual movement of wares." CURTIS, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND INTER-
PRETATION (1928) 46: "Gamblers, likewise, at great effort and waste of
time, accomplish the transfer of the ownership of goods without increasing
the adaptation of the goods to human use. It is often the case, also, that
those who pretend to speculate by purchasing goods for later sale only
acquire for themselves the gains which have been produced by others."
Cf. Senator Caraway: "Of course he [the speculator] does not produce
anything." HEARINGS ON S. 454, 20. Adam Smith's distinction between
productive and non-productive labor must have exercised a powerful in-
fluence in shaping the judicial attitude toward wagering. He restricted
productive labor to that involved in the physical handling of goods. Hence
physicians, lawyers, clergymen and governmental officials were non-pro-
ductive laborers. 1 ADAMI SuITH, THE WEALTH OF NATION (Everyman's
ed.) 295. The distinction is critized by Prof. Seligman. Ibid. Introduction,
.°M°
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of wagering3 Again, wagering on some events tends to create
an incentive to bring about the event, as in cases where heavy
speculators try to manipulate the market. In all these cases the
agreement itself will not tell whether or not it falls within the
class of condemned transactions, because the legal invalidity of
the agreement rests, in the last analysis, upon the consequences
of the type of conduct with which it is identified.
The agreement in Case No. 1 would thus be denied enforce-
ment because of the tendencies of agreements of that type, as
ascertained more or less accurately on the basis of experience.
Is the "intention" of A and B of any significance in this connec-
tion? While a moral sentimentalist might impute to A and B
intentions to do wrong, it seems clear that the only "intention"
which need be inferred is the intention to make this agreement;
and that is inferred from the facts above given.3
Now modify Case No. 1:
Case No. 2: In consideration of $1,000 paid by B, A prom-
ises to pay B $1,000 for each cent per bushel over $1.10 which
Grade X wheat (May delivery) sells for on the Chicago Board
of Trade in May, 1931.
Here the assumption that B has no "interest" which is indem-
nified by A's promise is not as clear as in the preceding case;
yet such indemnity agreements are rare. Probably the agree-
ment is prima facie a wagering contract. 6 Certainly it is un-
enforceable if neither party has an extraneous interest in the
event; and this result follows regardless of any "intention" of
the parties except the intention to make such an agreement as is
inferred from their utterances.
Case No. 3: In December, 1930, A promises to sell and B to
buy Grade X wheat, 10,000 bushels, at $1.10 per bushel, de-
livery at seller's option any time during May, 1931.
This agreement, "on its face," is a valid contract to sell un-
specified goods. It fits neatly into the abstract categories of
the Uniform Sales Act. To a person innocent of the iniquitous
practices of bucket shops A is an honest farmer selling the fruits
of his toil to B, an honest miller who will make the wheat into
flour for the body politic. Courts more or less uniformly take
3 4 See HARDY, RISK AND RIsK-BEAxIN0 (1923) 369-372; READINGS IN
RISK AND RIsK-BEARING (1924) 363.
3 Like most mentalistic legal terms, "intention" is difficult to define. For
the purpose of legal reasoning, "intention to make the agreement" means
just the inference drawn from the conduct described in Case No. 1. Yet
additional facts would destroy the inference, e. g., if it were proved that
both A and B spoke obviously in jest.
36 Case No. 2 resembles the "ups" and "downs" litigated in Nash-
Wright Co. v. Wright, supra note 31, which held such agreements to be
wagers where the only interest indemnified was based on another wagering
agreement. There words of "purchase" and "sale" were used.
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this innocent attitude toward such agreements, and there are
good reasons of procedural convenience, if not of economic policy,
for doing soA7 Hence the agreement in Case No. 3 would pre-
sumptively be enforceable. That is, if B refuses to take and pay
for the grain tendered by A during May, 1931, A may success-
fully maintain an action for damages; for A's refusal to deliver
the grain by June 1st, 1931, B may successfully maintain an
action. In either case, the measure of damages is standardized
at the difference between contract price and market value at the
time and place of delivery.
Now suppose that, in addition to the facts of Case No. 3, A
and B at the same time said:
Case No. 4: "Agreed that no actual delivery of wheat is to
be made, but we will settle by payment in money of the dif-
ference between contract price and market price on the Chicago
Board of Trade at the time when delivery is to be made." ls
not this case the same as Case No. 3, with the addition of a
clause specifying the measure of damages for breach of the
agreement, a measure identical with that which the court will
apply in the absence of any agreement? Does not every prom-
isor have the power to break his promise and pay the legally
assessable damages,38 and what is the harm in allowing the par-
ties to stipulate frankly that payment rather than performance
shall be the consequence of the agreement?
On the contrary, is not Case No. 4 substantially the same as
Case No. 1 or Case No. 2? A and B use the words "buy" and
"sell" in peculiar senses, defined by their mutual code, and when
with the aid of this code their utterances are translated into the
community code - one finds that they have in effect exchanged
promises to pay money on the happening of a future uncertain
event, namely, the quoted price of Grade X May wheat. Pre-
sumptively (but only presumptively) such an agreement is unen-
forceable. It is one thing to stipulate for the payment of dam-
ages if a breach of the promise shall, perchnce, occur; it is
37 The procedural inconvenience of investigating the social and economic
desirability of every agreement presented for judicial sanction, would im-
pose an intolerable burden on the courts. Moreover, laissez faire is still
a "brooding omnipresence" of economic policy, or business-man's vores.
"The measure [Caraway Bill] seeks to strike at freedom of trade or barter,
-which has been the root of the prosperity of the country...." F. B. Haynes,
President of the New Orleans Cotton Exchange, in January, 192G. H&%R-
INGS oN S. 454, 44.
38 HoLmEs, THE CoImoN LAW (1881) 301: "The only universal con-
sequence of a legally binding promise is, that the law makes the promisor
pay damages if the promised event does not come to pass. In every case
it leaves him free from interference until the time for fulfillment has gone
by, dud therefore free to break his contract if he chooses."
39 WImom, EVmENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2466.
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quite another to stipulate that the payment of money shall be
substituted for some other performance ostensibly promised.
The difference cannot be explained in terms of legal remedies,
but only in terms of the extra-legal consequences of the two
types of transactions.
If' "intention not to make delivery" means merely that the
parties to a futures contract have simultaneously made an addi-
tional agreement like that set forth above, the significance of
"intention not to deliver" is clear. The communicated inten-
tion of both parties not to deliver makes the futures contract
int6 a prima facie wager. It is only a "pseudo-sale" contract.
In searching for "intention not to deliver" the courts are striv-
ing to strip off the disguise of a trade terminology.
The parol evidence rule does not exclude evidence which shows
that the agreement was illegal, and hence unenforceable. Even
if the effect of such evidence is to prove that a different agree-
ment, outside the writing, was the "real" agreement, and that
this "real" agreement is illegal, the rule does not exclude it.4
The evidence from which "intention not to deliver" is inferred
rarely shows an agreement to settle in cash as explicit as that
recited in Case No. 4. Usually the evidence is circumstantial.
Judicial rulings on relevancy and permissible inferences become
decisive of the litigation. These rulings will be guided, to a
considerable degree (lessened by judicial deference to legislative
policy), by the judicial attitude toward produce exchanges. Still,
making due allowance for variations on close cases, it seems
scarcely controvertible that futures contracts entered into for the
purpose of "hedging" will come under the ban of the "pseudo-
sale" test. They will not (or, at least, strict hedging will not)
come under the ban of social and economic policy.41 The ac-
curacy of this analysis may be tested by examining the varieties
of the intention test, and the evidence used in testing the legality
of futures contracts.
III. VARIETIES OF "INTENTION" TEST
A. Undisclosed Intention of One Party
The statutes of a few states are so worded as to invalidate an
40 Ibid §§ 2406, 2414; Wheeler v. Metropolitan Stock Exchange, 72 N. H.
315, 56 Atl. 754 (1903); Maybank v. Rogers, 98 S. C. 279, 82 S. E. 422
(1914); WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 10, at § 1753.
41 The Caraway Bill declared it to be unlawful for any person to send a
message offering future delivery of cotton or grain across state lines,
"without intending that such cotton or grain shall be actually delivered or
received." HEARINGS ON S. 454, 2. Two Secretaries of Agriculture advised
the Senate Committee that the enactment of the bill would "substantially
impair, if not actually destroy, the valuable hedging facility...." Supra note
5. (Significant, but not conclusive support of the text).
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agreement for the sale of futures where only one party to the
agreement has no "intention" to take (or make) delivery. 42
These statutes have been construed to apply even where the in-
tention of the one party was not communicated to the other.43
Thus, in Price v. Barnes," the plaintiffs, commission mer-
chants in St. Louis, bought and sold grain and cotton for Barnes
(the defendant's testator) who operated a general store, a cotton
gin and several farms in southeast Missouri. The evidence
showed that Barnes had no storage facilities for receiving the
large quantities of wheat which he had contracted to "buy," had
insufficient means to pay for his purchases, and was not a dealer
in such commodities. While there was evidence that the plain-
tiff, too, never intended to make delivery,4 5 the trial court charged
that the intention of either party to gamble would render the
contract "void," "notwithstanding the other party may be ever
so innocent and wholly unaware of the intention to gamble or
speculate entertained by the other." A judgment for the de-
fendant was affirmed.
A statute of this type will not enable a party to escape a
contract whenever he chooses to swear that he had no intention
of taking (or making) delivery, for his own testimony as to his
intention, while admissible, will be accepted with caution, and
may be overcome by other evidence of a different intention at the
time the agreement was made."' At best, however, the effect of
42 ARK. Di. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 2653; MICH. CoMP. LAwS
(Cahill, 1915) § 15091; Mo. REv. STAT. (1919) § 3572; S. C. CIvIL CODE
(1922) §§ 5165-5166; TENN. ANN CODE (Shannon, 1919) § 3166. The
statutes declaring bucket-shops unlawful frequently declare that the in-
tention of the bucket-shop proprietor alone suffices to make the transaction
illegal. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 390; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 10488;
IOWA CODE (1927) § 9898. The Caraway Bill apparently made the inten-
tion of one party decisive. HEARINGS ON S. 454, 2, § 2.
43 Maybank v. Rogers, supra note 40; Price v. Barnes, 300 Mo. 216, 254
S. AV. 33 (1923); cf. McGrew v. City Produce Exchange, 85 Tenn. 572, 577
(1887); Huff v. State, 164 Ark. 211, 261 S. W. 654 (1924). But ef. State
National Bank v. Anderson, 198 S. W. 511 (Mo. App. 1917).
44 Supra note 43.
45 Plaintiff's books showed entries only of the "differences" on trans-
actions which were closed out at a profit or at a loss to deceased. It does
not appear, however, that plaintiff merely "bucketed" the orders; pre-
sumably Barnes' purchases were executed on an exchange.
46McClure v. Wilson, 292 Fed. 109 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923), applying the
South Carolina statute. A letter written by the defendant's agent at
the time cotton was bought went into some detail about delivery; this evi-
dence was held to contradict the defendant's sworn statement of intention
to gamble so effectively that the trial court did not err in refusing to
submit the question to the jury. Likewise, in Parker v. Moore, 115 Fed.
799 (C. C. A. 4th, 1902), the defendant's testimony that he intended to
gamble was held not to require a directed verdict in his favor. In this
case, however, the court, obviously disapproving of a defense based upon
the defendant's undisclosed intent, construed the South Carolina statute as
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such a statute is to invalidate hedging agreements by legitimate
dealers or manufacturers.
In most jurisdictions the undisclosed intention of the defend-
ant to settle in cash is no defense to an action based on a futures
contract.47  These holdings are consistent with the "pseudo-sale"
theory. They are also consistent, however, with a theory that
the plaintiff's intention to wager, when he entered into the
futures agreement, bars his recovery against the innocent de-
fendant8 Apparently the only holdings which require the latter
explanation, however, are two cases -1 in which the court denied
the customer recovery of money paid in reliance on a contract
with the defendant broker where there was proof of the plain-
tiff's intention to gamble but no proof that the broker was aware
of such an intention. The action was for money had and re-
ceived (quasi-contract), a proceeding often said to be "equi-
table" in nature. The "clean hands" maxim of equity thus be-
comes applicable. In other words, the plaintiff may be denied
recovery if he has wickedly intended or attempted to gamble,
even though the agreement made was not a wagering agree-
ment when tested by the "pseudo-sale" analysis. The "clean
hands" theory seems broad enough to justify an inquiry into the
social desirability of the plaintiff's conduct in each particular
case. The legitimate hedger should, therefore, not be de denied
not authorizing such a defense. The Federal courts adhered to this inter-
pretation until Maybank v. Rogers, supra note 40, settled the validity of
such a defense. In McLure v. Wilson, supra, the court reluctantly paid
lip-service to the rule of the South Carolina court, yet managed to affirm
a directed verdict for the plaintiff, a bona fide dealer in cotton. These de-
cisions under the South Carolina statute illustrate how conflicting drives
of social policy work their way through the legal concepts employed in
analyzing a set of facts.
47 Browne v. Thorn, 260 U. S. 137, 43 Sup. Ct. 36 (1922); Claiborne Com-
mission Co. v. Stirlen, 262 S. W. 387 (Mo. App. 1924) (applying Illinois
law); Lamson v. Turner, 277 Fed. 680 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921) (Illinois
law); Pixley v. Boynton, 79 Ill. 351 (1875); Nash-Wright Co. v. Wright,
supra note 31; Miller Co. v. Klovstad, 14 N. D. 435, 105 N. W. 164 (1905);
Hoyt v. Wickham, supra note 7; cf. Springs v. James, 137 App. Div. 110,
121 N. Y. Supp. 1054 (1st Dep't 1910), aff'd, 202 N. Y. 603, 96 N. E. 1131
(1911); Cohen v. Rothschild, 182 App. Div. 408, 169 N. Y. Supp. 659 (1st
Dep't 1918); Solomon v. Newburger, 35 F. (2d) 328 (C. C. A. 8th 1929).
Cases in which the one who intended a gambling transaction is denied re-
covery against the innocent party, are discussed infra.
48 WILLISTON, op. cit., supra note 10, at § 1670.
49 Higgins v. McCrea, 116 U. S. 671, 6 Sup. Ct. 557 (1886); White v.
Barber, 123 U. S. 392, 8 Sup. Ct. 238 (1887) (explainable on other grounds).
See Parker v. Moore, supra note 46, at 804; Nash-Wright Co. v. Wright,
supra note 31, at 250. It may be questioned whether or not the plaintiff's
delictum is not outweighed by the defendant's disloyalty to his principal,
the plaintiff. WOODWARD, QUAsi-CoNTRACTS (1913) § 148.
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recovery against a defaulting broker., This boon to the hedger
is likely to remain academic, however, since, due to the extra-legal
sanctions of produce exchange by-laws, members of recognized
exchanges seldom default on their obligations. In the vast ma-
jority of litigated cases the plaintiff is the broker (or commis-
sion merchant).
B. Disclosed Intention of 0ne Party
It is a logical possibility that A intends to settle in cash, dis-
closes this intention to B, and yet B intends to deliver (or take
delivery). But it is not a plausible situation. It often occurs,
however, that there is evidence that A had no intention of taking
delivery and that B knew this; there is no direct evidence to
show that B had any "intention" either way, other than that
manifested by making the "futures" agreement. Under these
facts courts have frequently upheld verdicts to the effect that
the agreement was a wager.31 This test does not differ sub-
stantially from the "pseudo-sale" test. If B knows that A has
no intention of taking delivery, the inference is strong, if not
conclusive, that B had no intention of making a futile tender of
delivery, especially since by so doing he would get no more dam-
ages than A was willing to pay anyhow. Hence the "real agree-
ment" was to settle in cash. Such an inference has been drawn
in a jurisdiction which requires "mutual intention" to settle in
cash.52
Usually brokers studiously avoid inquiry as to the "inten-
tions" of their customers.- The occupation of the customer and
his financial standing may furnish the basis for an inference
that the broker knew his intention not to deliver; " yet where
the customer is a dealer or manufacturer, who regularly makes
some contracts with intention to deliver (or to take delivery),
the inference that the particular agreement in litigation was
50 The question cannot arise in this form unless the broker is in default.
If the customer alleges the illegality of the transaction, he will be treated
in pan delicto, unless a statute expressly authorizes recovery by the "cus-
tomer", as in McGrew v. City Produce Exchange, supra note 43.
5!Kilpatrick v. Richter, 146 Ga. 277, 91 S. E. 51 (1916) ; Hyman & Co. v.
Hay, 277 Fed. 898 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922) (Louisiana law); James v.
Clement, 223 Fed. 385 (C. C. A. 5th, 1915) (Georgia law), cf. Jacobs v.
Hyman, 286 Fed. 346 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923).
52 0hlendorf v. Bennett, 241 ll. App. 537 (1926); Jamieson v. Wallace,
167 Ill. 388, 47 N. E. 762 (1897). The Jamieson case is practically indis-
tinguishable, on its facts, from the cases cited supra note 51. See Botts
v. Mercantile Bank, 170 App. Div. 879, 881, 156 N. Y. Supp. 700, 702 (1st
Dep't 1915).
53 (1923) 2 GRAiN EXPORTERS 9.
54Cf. Jamieson v. Wallace, supra note 52 (stock purchase by woman of
limited means); Hartwig v. Booth, 217 Ill. App. 70 (1920) (small druggist
bought 10,000 bushels of wheat).
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made with a contrary intention, must be supported by the clear-
est kind of evidence. 55 The "disclosed intention" test undoubt-
edly gives a court considerable latitude in interpreting such evi-
dence. A court which is hostile to speculation in futures will
draw the introspective inference that B was aware, when he
made the agreement, of A's intent to gamble; r while a court
friendly to the produce exchanges will, on facts scarcely distin-
guishable, decline to draw such an inference.57 This is not the
first time that introspective terminology has been used as camou-
flage for unarticulated theories of policy. 8
C. "Bilatiral" or "Mutual" Intention Not to Deliver
The paper formula in judicial opinions is that, to sustain a de-
fense of illegality to a "futures" contract, the defendant must
prove that both parties had no intention that delivery should
be made.59 The same formula is indicated, more or less clearly,
by the language of numerous statutes.0 Does it mean that
where the evidence shows that each party, separately, never in-
tended that delivery should be made ("bilateral intention"), or
that only where the intention of each is revealed to the other
("mutual intention"), the contract is unenforceable? The lat-
ter meaning is consistent with the "pseudo-sale" analysis given
above; the former is not. The latter meaning makes it easier to
uphold a "hedging" agreement by one who is known to the
broker as a legitimate dealer; the former meaning would make
it easier to invalidate such an agreement.
The decisions do not give a clear-cut answer to the question.
While proof of an "explicit agreement" to gamble is sufficient,"'
55 Cf. Lamson v. Turner, supra note 47 (Illinois law; dealings by cor-
poration, engaged in buying selling, and shipping grain); Pixley v. Boynton,
supra note 47 (purchase of grain by one "extensively engaged in shipping
grain") Miller Co. v. Klovstad, supra note 47; McCarthy Bros. Co. v.
Equity Co-op. Ass'n, 286 Fed. 171 (D. Mont. 1923) (strict interpretation of
broker's knowledge about particular contract).
56 James v. Clement, Kilpatrick v. Richter, both supra note 51.
5 Cf. Cohen v. Rothschild, supra note 47 (note the court's assumption that
no "reputable broker" would make a wagering contract).
58 Cf. WIGMORE2, op. cit. supra note 39, at § 242.
59 Pixley v. Boynton, supra note 47; Hooper v. Nuckles, 39 So. 711 (Ala.
1905) ; Springs v. James, supra note 47; Kilpatrick v. Richter, supra note
51; Edgeley Co-op. Grain Co. v. Spitzer, 48 N. D. 406, 184 N. W. 880
(1921) ; Lamson v. Turner, supra note 47.
60 E.g., ALA. Civ. CoDE (1923) § 6816; ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1927) c.
38, § 308; KAN. REv. STAT. (1923) §§ 50-122; MAsS. GEN. LAWs (1921) c.
137, § 6; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 10223-1; OHIO GEN. CODE (Page,
1926) § 13070; TEx PENAL CODE (1928) art. 657. Cf. GA. CODE (1914), as
amended by Acts, 1929, p. 245, § 4264 (2) : "where parties do not contem-
plate delivery."
61 Harvey v. Merrill, 150 Mass. 1 (1889) ; James v. Clement, supra note 51;
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such proof is rarely presented. In most cases the evidence is
circumstantial, and after making inferences as to the intention of
each party, the court is likely to slide over the inference of
disclosure.
The case of Counselnan v. Reichart, : a decision from the
great agricultural state of Iowa, illustrates this propensity. A
Chicago broker sued an Iowa grain dealer for grain actually
shipped, and for the loss on a contract to buy May oats which
the plaintiff had made on the defendant's telegraphic order. This
contract was closed out by the plaintiff in January because of
the defendant's failure to put up margins. The plaintiff ap-
pealed from a judgment allowing him only the price of the grain
actually delivered. In affirming this judgment, the court relied
upon the defendant's sworn testimony that he had not intended
to take delivery of the May oats. This evidence was deemed
sufficient to establish the defendant's intention. +3 Despite the
plaintiff's testimony that he intended to make delivery-a state-
ment buttressed by the circumstance that the defendant had taken
delivery on one of his orders-the jury was allowed to infer the
plaintiff's intention to gamble from the fact that he failed to
produce written memoranda showing actual purchases made on
the defendant's behalf.6 Here was "bilateral" intention. For
communication, the court found that the apparently innocent
telegrams to buy on margins were to be read in the light of the
"generally known fact that business on the board of trade is
conducted on a plan of non-delivery of the produce." The
formula laid down by the court was:
"To make the contract void as between these parties, the in-
tention to make a gambling contract must have been mutual.
...There was no purpose to make defendant's uncommuni-
cated intentions a part of the contract, except in so far as they
were understood, and, together with plaintiff's intentions, com-
pleted an understanding." r5
Yet the court did say, in the course of its opinion,
"If both had that intention [that no delivery should be made],
it made a meeting of minds upon that fact, and that is what
made the contract." 06
In other cases which have purported to apply the "mutual in-
State v. Clayton, 138 N. C. 732, 50 S. E. 866 (1905) (jury found agreement
to settle in cash).
62 103 Iowa 430, 72 N. W. 490 (1897).
63 But cf. AMcLure v. Wilson, supra note 46.
64 The Iowa statute required such proof, apparently in order to require the
broker to prove that he was not "bucketing" the orders. The decision might,
but does not, rest on this ground.
65 103 Iowa at 432, 434, 72 N. W. at 491, citing Iowa statutes.
66Ibid. 433, 72 N. W. at 491.
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tention" test the evidence of a "pseudo-sale" has been stronger,
and it seems safe to say that the decided preponderance of judi-
cial authority (in many cases based on statutory provisions)
supports the "mutual intention" test.6 T While proof that the
broker "bucketed" the orders makes the inference of a "pseudo-
sale" practically conclusive, 8 denial of recovery is not confined
to the "bucket shop" cases. Conversely, in decisions allowing
the broker recovery on orders for futures trades, in grain or in
cotton, the reason given is failure to prove mutual intention not
to deliver.69 While no case has been found in which each party,
unknown to the other, had an intent not to deliver, it seems that
these facts would fall short of maintaining the defense of ille-
gality.70 At the least the intent of one party not to deliver must
be palpable, and the inference of palpability becomes crucial in
the decision of particular controversies, as one may see by care-
fully comparing the cases reaching opposite conclusions.
The test of wagering as formulated in most statutes and judi-
cial decisions thus makes no distinction between hedging agree-
ments and other futures transactions made with mutual inten-
tion that no delivery shall occur in performance of the trans.
action. The "mutual intention" test is too narrow to satisfy
the requirements of social and economic policy. A candid ac-
ceptance of this conclusion would lead to legislative modification
of the test in such a way as to define wagering in terms of par-
ticular institutions, or rather to except socially desirable insti-
tutions from the operation of the formula. Such legislation
67 Cases in which the futures agreement was held unenforceable at the
suit of one who "intended" no delivery: James v. Clement, supra note 51;
Ohlendorf v. Bennett, supra note 52; Benson-Stabeek Co. v. Reservation
Farmers' Grain Co., 62 Mont. 254, 205 Pac. 651 (1922); Lamson v. West,
201 Ill. App. 251 (1916); Lane v. Logan Grain Co., 105 Mo. App. 215, 79
S. W. 722 (1904); Board of Trade v. O'Dell Commission Co., 115 Fed.
574 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1902); Hartwig v. Booth, supra note 54; Sprague v.
Warren, 26 Neb. 326, 41 N. W. 1113 (1889).
68 Carey v. Myers, 92 Kan. 493, 141 Pac. 602 (1914); Barnes v. State,
77 Ark. 124, 91 S. W. 10 (1905). While a "bucket shop" proprietor, to
save expenses, ordinarily does not execute trades on a recognized exchange
to carry out his customers' orders, he may pn rare occasions be obliged to
make an actual trade. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1930) tit.
Bucket Shops.
69 McCarthy Bros. v. Equity Co-op. Ass'n, supra note 55; Miller Co. v.
Klovstad, supra note 47; Sampson v. Camperdown Mills, 82 Fed. 833 (C.
C. S. C. 1897) (but of. McLure v. Wilson, supra note 46); Springs v. James,
supra note 47; Hooper v. Nuckles, supra note 59; Dillon v. MlcCrea, 59 Ill.
App. 505 (1895); Jacobs v. Hyman, supra note 51; Cohen v. Rothschild,
supra note 47; Botts v. Mercantile Bank, supra note 52; Bell Co. v. Ember.
son, 182 Wis. 433, 196 N. W. 861 (1924); Lamson v. Mensen, 187 Iowa
972, 174 N. W. 688 (1919).




might expressly legitimize only hedging trades, in which case a
method of distinguishing hedging from pure speculation would
be indispensable; or it might except all futures trading on
recognized exchanges. Without such legislation, some courts
have attained one or the other of these modifications under the
guise of applying the mutual intention test. Judicial attitudes
toward organized exchanges frequently seem decisive.
IV. JUDICIAL ATTITUDES TOWARD ORGANIZED EXCHANGES
Hedging is- carried on through organized exchanges.71 Conse-
quently to the extent that courts enforce all orders for exchange
trades they will uphold'the validity of hedging transactions.
Hence an account of the legality of hedging must include a de-
scription of the way some courts have interpreted the mutual
intention test so as to legalize not only trades between members
of the exchange (which are rarely litigated) but also agree-
ments between non-members and brokers (members or non-
members) which are carried out in accordance with exchange
practices.
Purporting to apply the mutual intention test of wagering,
many courts have been guided, in drawing an inference of in-
tent not to deliver, by their attitude toward futures trading on
organized exchanges. In New York, for instance, it seems prac-
tically impossible to prove that a transaction with a reputable
broker on the New York Cotton Exchange is a wagering agree-
ment.7 2 A retired fur dealer, who trusted an exchange member
to trade at the latter's discretion, was denied recovery of money
so paid because the rules of the Exchange sternly forbade the
making of contracts with an agreement that no delivery should
Take place -3 and because it was "improbable" that the defend-
ants, "reputable brokers," would have made such an agreement.
In another case the Appellate Division refused to apply an in-
validating statute of benighted Tennessee on the ground that the
statute was penal legislation, opposed to the public policy of the
state of New York with its busy cotton exchange. 4
This tendency to uphold the legality of exchange transactions
is not confined to the money centers where speculation is rife.
In recent years one finds a marked tendency elsewhere to deny
that futures transactions are wagers. Thus the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin bestowed a qualified blessing upon the Milwaukee
71 Cf. § 6 of the Grain Futures Act, supra note 6.
7 Springs v. James, Cohen v. Rothschild, both supra note 47; Botts v.
Mercantile Bank, supra note 52.
73 Cohen v. Rothschild, supra note 47. Suits by the customer to recover
money paid for margins appear to be extremely rare.
74 Botts v. Mercantile Bank, supra note 52.
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Chamber of Commerce.15 The evidence in the case seems in-
distinguishable from that in Counselman v. Reiohcr, 0 i.e., a
series of transactions in which purchases of "cash grain" were
mingled with "playing the market." In reversing a judgment
for defendant (the customer), the court said:
"It is undoubtedly true that the great majority of contracts
made through the agency of boards of trade are gambling con-
tracts; that thousanas of persons every year enter into such con-
tracts fancying that they can foresee the trend of the world's
markets better than their fellows, and have their awakening
when compelled to pay their losses.
"On the other hand, a vast amount of important and legiti-
mate business is carried on every day through the agency of
boards of trade. Speculation is not necessarily gambling, and
contracts to be consuminated on boards of trade, if intended to
be carried out in good faith, are as legitimate as the innumerable
other contracts made. in the business world in which gains or
losses may depend on changes in market values." 77
A recent Iowa decision 78 is irreconcilable, both on its facts and
on its reasoning, with the earlier Iowa decision in Counselman
v. Reichart. An Iowa farmer ordered a broker to "buy" corn
on the Chicago Board of Trade, cautioning the broker's agent
(who took his order) not to let the local banker know that he
was "speculating." The court upheld a verdict and judgment
for the broker, saying:
"Nothing was said about delivery; but this would naturally
be implied from the purchase; nor was anything said about
speculating on the rise or fall of the market or gambling on the
board of trade." 79
Since exchange trades, and agreements for the making of such
trades, are customarily framed in the language of buying and
selling, it is possible for courts to indulge a presumption of in-
tention to deliver which makes proof of a contrary intention
practically impossible. Moreover, the letter-heads of brokers
and commission merchants frequently contain the following ad-
monition to their customers:
75 Bell Co. v. Emberson, supra note 69. The Milwaukee Chamber of
Commerce is more extensively used as a cash grain market than is, for
example, the Chicago Board of Trade.
7 6 Supra note 62.
77 Ibid. 446, 196 N. W. at 866. Note the confusion of "speculation" by
those who handle goods with speculation by those who at best help otherg to
handle goods.
7 8 Lamson v. Mensen, supra note 69.
79 Ibid. 977, 174 N. W. at 690. A very similar conversation between the
customer and the broker's agent has been held to show wagering so con-
clusively that a verdict for the broker could not stand. James v. Clement,
supra note. 51.
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"All transactions made by us for your account contemplate
the actual receipt and delivery of the property and payment
therefor."' ,0
If the language of the overt bargain is treated as conclusive,
the "pseudo-sale" theory is practically repudiated. Likewise,
if one treats the exchange rule, forbidding agreements that no
delivery shall be made, as conclusive proof that delivery is always
intended, the "pseudo-sale" test is discarded and futures trad-
ing on or through exchanges having such a rule is unqualifiedly
approved. If such a rule means that exchange trades, or agree-
ments therefor, are always made with intention of delivery it is
difficult to understand the opposition of the organized exchanges
to statutes which prohibit the making of agreements without in-
tent to deliver.81
It is sometimes said that if either party can "compel" delivery
(or acceptance), the agreement is valid2- This begs the ques-
tion.83 A more sophisticated inference is that "mutual intention"
to set-off other contracts or to make "ring settlements" under the
rules of the exchange, is not equivalent to the "mutual intention
to settle in cash" of the paper formula.8 This distinction is ap-
parently approved by Mr. Justice Holmes in Board of Trade v.
80 See Bell Co. v. Emberson, supra note 69, at 438, 19G N. W. at 863;
Hoyt v. Wickham, supra, note 7; Clark v. McNeill, 2.5 F. (2d) 247 (C. C. A.
6th, 1928). In the last case the court found that actions spoke louder than
words.
s' The Caraway Bill (supra note 1) prohibited the sending of messages
offering to make a contract "without intending that such cotton or grain
shall be actually delivered or received.... " In expressing his opposition to
this bill, Mr. Frank B. Hayne, president of the New Orleans Cotton Ex-
change, read into the record a rule of the exchange prohibiting the making
of contracts "with any stipulation or understanding between the parties, at
the time of making such contract, that the terms of such contract are not
to be fulfilled and the cotton received and delivered." Yet he stated
unequivocally that the enactment of the bill "would so restrict trading in
future contracts as to ultimately abolish future trading in the American
exchanges." "As president of an exchange," he declared, "I positively state
that if the selling of cotton was confined only to those who possess that
cotton oi who intended to possess cotton, the exchanges would immediately
have to close their doors." HEARINGS ON S. 454, 44, 47. Either the exchange
rules do not apply to dealings with non-members, or they are to be taken
in a Pickwickian sense.
s2Sampson v. Camperdown Cotton Mills, supra note 69.
83 Similarly, EDm=Y, op. cit. supra note 1, at 100, n. 1, says: "A bucket-
shop 'contract' reads in terms of a sale and purchase, but is gambling be-
cause it cannot be enforced." (Italics ours).
4"Intention to deliver" and "intention to settle by payment of differ-
ences" are often put as the two alternatives. WMLLION op. cit. cupra
note 10, at § 1670. But the institutional practices have blurred this simple
distinction. Sometimes "contemplation" of delivery is used in place of "in-
tention." A trader may "contemplate" delivery as a melancholy possibility
without having any "intention" of delivery.
YALi LAW JOURNAL
Kinsey Co., 5 in which the Chicago Board of Trade sought to
enjoin the purloining of its market quotations. The defendant
alleged that the- plaintiff's hands were soiled with gambling. In
decreeing an injunction, the court (with three justices dissent-
ing) declared the defense irrelevant, if true.9 Mr. Justice
Holmes went further, however, and approved the exchange prac-
tice of settling contracts by set-off or "ring settlement," saying:
"Purchases made with the understanding that the contract
will be settled by paying the difference between the contract and
the market price at a certain time " . . . stand on different
ground from purchases made merely with the expectation that
they will be satisfied by set-off." 8
Is this distinction a logical application of the mutual inten-
tion test, or is it based upon a broader premise of social and
economic policy? First, is the difference between an "under-
standing" (cash settlemnent) and an "expectation" (set-off settle-
ment) merely verbal? Now "understanding" may mean "mu-
tual" (communicated) intention, whereas "expectation" may
mean "bilateral" (uncommunicated) intention. But su'rely this
is another distinction than the one aimed at here, and surely the
learned justice means us to take "understanding" and "expecta-
tion" in the same sense.89 With this assumption the "under-
1 Supra note 23.
86 "If, then, the plaintiff's collection of information is otherwise entitled
to protection, it does not cease to be so, even if it is information concern-
ing illegal acts. The statistics of crime are property to the same extent
as any other statistics, even if collected by a criminal who furnishes some
of the data." Ibid. 251, 25 Sup. Ct. at 640.
87 Here the learned justice cites two cases: Embrey v. Jemison, 131 U.
S. 336, 9 Sup. Ct. 776 (1889) in which a brokerage firm a member of tho.
New York Cotton Exchange, was held not entitled to recover from a cus-
tomer for losses on "futures" transactions on the Exchange, if defendant
proved his allegation that "delivery of actual cotton was never contem-
plated," and "it was understood between them that the settlement was to
be made between said parties by one party paying to the other the differ-
ence between the contract price and the market price;" Weare Commission
Co. v. People, 209 Ill. 528, 70 N. E. 1076 (1904), in which a member of
the Chicago Board of Trade was found guilty of violating the Illinois stat-
ute against "bucket-shops and wagering," becaluse he executed, on ihe
Board of Trade, orders for the purchase of grain futures, knowing that the
customers intended to "sell" before delivery and settle in cash for the price
difference though the rules of the Board of Trade sternly forbade pseudo-
sales. In neither case did it appear that the broker settled by the set-off
method with other members of the exchange, but very probably such proof
would not have altered the result.
88 198 U. S. at 249, 25 Sup. Ct. at 639. See also WILLISTON, Op. Cit.
supra note 10, at § 1672.
89 In the paragraph preceding the sentence quoted he says: "The fact
that contracts are satisfied in this way by set-off and the payment of dif-
ferences detracts in no degree from the good faith of the parties, and if
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standing" that settlement be made by payment of differences is
analytically equivalent to the "understanding" that settlement
will be made by set-off or "ringing out." For the latter merely
adds a bookkeeping device to the former; the final result is the
same-payment of dash differences, not as an afterthought, but
in performance of the original expectation to that effect. Under
the "mutual intention" test, this is a wagering agreement.P
The real basis of Mr. Justice Holmes' distinction can be stated
only in terms of institutions and the policy of the government in
dealing with them. Produce exchanges, in which the "set-off"
settlement is used, are different from "bucket shops," in wlich
a direct payment or collection of price differences is employed.
A small fraction of exchange contracts, whfile virtually none of
the bucket shop contracts, are settled by delivery of grain. What
is more important, the exchange is an important and useful
business institution; and not the least of its usefulness is in the
machinery which it provides for legitimate hedging. That Mr.
Justice Holmes is going back of the "mutual intention" test to
the "social desire" which produced it, is apparent from the fol-
lowing excerpts:
"There is no doubt, from the rules of the board of trade or
the evidence, that the contracts made between the members are
intended and supposed to be binding in manner and form as they
are made. There is no doubt that a large part of those con-
tracts is made for serious business purposes. Hedging, for in-
stance, as it is called, is a means by which collectors and ex-
porters of grain or other products, and manufacturers who make
contracts in advance for the sale of their goods, secure them-
selves against the fluctuations of the market by counter con-
tracts for the purchase or sale, as the case may be, of an equal
quantity of the product, or of the material of manufacture. It
is none the less a serious business contract for a legitimate and
useful purpose that it may be offset before the time of delivery
the parties know when they make such contracts that they are very likely
to have a chance to satisfy them in that way, and intend to Mfahe 1se of it,
that fact is perfectly consistent with a serious business purpose, and an
intent that the contract shall mean what it says." 198 U. S. at 248, 23
Sup. Ct. at 639. Here the distinction suggested in the first italicized phrase
is of a different kind: knowing that I may be able to settle in cash without
legal penalties or loss of membership in the exchange, I nevertheless in-
tend to deliver the wheat which I have contracted to sell. The distinction
is subtle and difficult to apply to the circumstantial evidence of "intention"
of the parties to a particular contract; it is a diffcrnt distinction, however,
from the one between intention to settle by payment of differences and in-
tention to settle by set-off.
sO In support of this conclusion, it should be noted that the United States
Cotton Futures Act treats settlement by set-off or "ring" settlement as




in case delivery should not be needed or desired." 01
Again,
"It seems to us an extraordinary and unlikely proposition that
the dealings which give its character to the great market for
future sales in this country are to be regarded as mere wagers
or as 'pretended' buying and selling, without any intention of
receiving and paying for the property bought, or of delivering
the property sold, within the meaning of the Illinois Act. Such
a view seems to us hardly consistent with the admitted fact that
the quotations of prices from the market are of the utmost im-
portance to the business world, and not least to the farmers." 2
Mr. Justice Holmes' opinion thus shifts the focus of attention
from "mutual intention" to the evaluation of institutional prac-
tices. In his dictum, however, the learned justice was evaluat-
ing the institution as a whole, not particular abuses of it. He
expressly limited his discussion to transactions between mem-
bers of the exchange .3 It does not follow that every agreement
between a member of the exchange and his customer is enforce-
able merely because the member contracts with another mem-
ber under the rules of the exchange, which require delivery on
"open" (uncancelled) contracts. Transactions between members
of the exchange are sanctioned by exchange penalties, extending
even to forfeiture of membership, which do not apply to the cus-
tomer, an outsider. Moreover, since a small fraction of all fu-
ture transactions are eventually settled by delivery of wheat,
every member of the exchange must always "contemplate" de-
livery as an ugly possibility even though he does not desire or
expect it in most instances. Even if this can be called an "in-
tention" to make (or take) delivery, the same cannot be said of
every customer. If for instance; the latter makes a "sale" with
intention to close-out by "buying" before the delivery day, he
can feel practically certain that he will not be called upon to
make delivery and quite certain that the penalty for failure to
make delivery will be no more than the difference between con-
tract and market price.
91 198 U. S. at 248, 25 Sup. Ct. at 639. "Serious business purpose" sug-
gests that wagering is, by contrast, a frivolous pastime. The emphasis on
policy is unmistakable. Note also that "equal quantity" suggests "strict
rule" hedging, and "may be offset" greatly overestimates the probability that
a hedging contract will be performed by actual delivery.
02 Ibid. 249, 25 Sup. Ct. at 639. A little further on, the learned justice
says: "A set-off is, in legal effect, a delivery." A bucket-shop proprietor
may set-off his "long" customers against his "shorts," or he may himself
buy to offset his "short" customers, and vice versa; but he does not "de-
liver." ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1930) tit. Bucket Shops.
Does not "in legal effect" imply a value judgment of the particular institu-
tion?
93 198 U. S. at 250, 25 Sup. Ct. at 639.
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Yet some lower federal courts have seized upon Mr. Justice
Holmes' distinction between cash settlement and set-off as a
means of validating agreements between customer and broker
dealing through a reputable produce exchange.' The latter
transaction is approved on the fallacious assumption that because
settling by set-off is "legitimate," it follows that agreeing when
the "sale" is vwde to settle thus is "legitimate." 11 Under this
reasoning it would be virtually impossible to prove that an
agreement between an exchange broker and his customer is a
wager. The rules and practices of the exchange do not permit
the broker to contract (with another member) for a simple
settlement in cash without the intervention of a set-off or ring
settlement, or a transfer to a clearing house.0 The effect of
these decisions is to validate all futures transactions made
through a member of an organized exchange, and hence to vali-
date all "hedging" transactions.
V. JUDICIAL ATTITUDES TOWARD HEDGERS
Without going so far as to approve all exchange transactions,
some courts have found devious ways of upholding futures agree-
94 Gettys v. Newburger, 272 Fed. 209 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921); Mullinix v.
Hubbard, 6 F. (2d) 109 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925); Hoyt v. Wickham, saupra
note 7; Lamson v. Turner, supra, note 47; Medlin milling Co. v. Moffat
Commission Co., 218 Fed. 686 (W. D. Mo. 1915). Also, Mackay Telegraph-
Cable Co. v. Bain, 163 S. W. 98 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914). Contra: Birming-
ham Trust & Savings Co. v. Currey, 175 Ala. 373, 57 So. 962 (1911). Cf.
-Andrews v. Shutt Co., 44 F. (2d) 337 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930).
95 Sanborn, J., in Gettys v. Newburger, supra note 94, at 219: "Where
such contracts are closed out before such times of delivery, the legal pre-
sumption is, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that at
the time the parties made the contracts they intended to close them out
by these legal methods, and not by the illegal method of paying the differ-
ence between the contract prices and the market prices at the times of
delivery, so that there would be no liability to deliver and no delivery of the
property at such times for deliveries; and this intention is a lawful inten-
tion which does not detract from the good faith of the parties or the
validity of the contracts." See also the statement of Lewis, J., in Mullinix
v. Hubbard, supra note 94, at 114. Just the opposite reasoning was adopted
by the Illinois court in Weare Commission Co. v. People, stipra note 87, at
541, 70 N. E. at 1080. "When Kruse [the customer] gave the order for
the purchase of grain, and made his deposit, and then, as soon as there was
a rise in the market price, sold out the grain, the presumption is that he
intended, when he first made the purchase, to sell out as soon as there was
a rise. And when the plaintiff in error [the broker], or its agent, aided
him in the transaction, and helped him to carry it out in this illegal way,
it is idle to say that the plaintiff in error did not know what the intention
of Xruse was."
96 See RULEs OF THE CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE (1930) §§ 288, 288A.
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ments which appear to be hedges.07  A picturesque statement of
the distinction is given by Borquin, J.:
"It must be noted that this is not the ordinary case of marginal
transactions between a more or less fugitive customer, not in the
grain trade, and brokers. Whenever the latter appears, the pre-
sumption of validity virtually disappears, and if a counter pre-
sumption does not arise, as in principle it might, proof of in-
validity is practically made, at least unless successfully rebutted
by the broker. For it is known of all men that the over-
whelming majority of the transactions last aforesaid intend no
deliveries, unless therein one can squeeze or break another, is
gambling pure and simple, and of most pernicious character, vic-
timizing the world, commonly increasing and rarely decreasing
the price of bread, plundering non-participants and rich and poor
alike for the profit of modern forestallers, engrossers and re-
graters, in comparison with which all Monte Carlos pale to in-
significance. On the contrary, the instant case and its trans-
actions are those usual and valid between a country elevator asso-
ciation, storing or buying grain at the point of production and
selling it at distant terminal markets, and brokerage or com-
mission houses, more or less necessarily employed to dispose of
the grain at the latter places." 98
Here the exchange transactions are righteously tarred, and
the whitewash is reserved only for hedging transactions. With-
out rejecting the mutual intention test, the court finds a way to
separate the tar from the whitewash. The method is not to
concede that the mutual intention test is only a prima. facie in-
ference which may be rebutted by proof of an "insurable in-
terest" (the interest hedged), but to infer that, since some of the
defendant's sales were followed by shipment of wheat, the plain-
tiff (broker) did not know that others were made with no in-
tention of fulfillment. This is a legitimate use of the inference
of palpability.
Other courts, however, feeling bound by statutes which make
the mutual intention test conclusive, have held hedging agree-
ments to be illegal. 9 Thus the Mississippi Supreme Court has
felt itself precluded, by the statutory test, from taking into con-
sideration the social utility of hedging:
"It may be true, and for the purpose of this discussion it will
be assumed, that the contracts made in New Orleans for the
97Lamson v. Turner, supra note 47; McCarthy Bros. v. Equity Co-op.
Ass'n, supra note 55; Edgely Co-op. Grain Co. v. Spitzer, supra note 59;
Miller Co. v. Klovstad, sv.pra note 47; Browne v. Thorn, supra note 47,
where an instruction that hedging is lawful was approved on appeal, with
the comment: "Piinu facie such transactions are lawful." Query, why
the "prima facie?" Cf. Medlin Milling Co. v. Moffat Commission Co.,
supra note 94.
98 McCarthy Bros. v. Equity Co-op. Ass'n, supra note 55, at 174.
99 Falk v. Alexander Mercantile Co., 138 Miss. 21, 102 So. 843 (1925);
State v. Clayton, supra note 61.
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sale of four hundred bales of cotton were made for the purpose
of hedging against any loss which the appellant might have sus-
tained by a decline in the price of cotton before he could sell
that which he had purchased from the appellee, and it may be,
as counsel for the appellant seem to contend, that such a con-
tract is not a wagering contract, and consequently is valid at
common law, although it was the intention of the parties that
the commodity therein sold was not to be delivered, but that
the settlement to be made under the contract was the payment
of the difference in price of the commodity arising out of the
rise and fall of the market price above or below the contract
price therefor, but with the common law we have here no con-
cern, for the case is controlled and must be decided by the
statute hereinbefore set out." "o
The result reached, a logical application of the mutual inten-
tion test to futures agreements avowedly made as hedges, shows
that the adoption of this test as a ca2zclz'siv c one invalidates
hedging agreements openly arrived at. If hedging agreements
are to be avowedly separated from illegitimate wagers, and not
merely protected sporadically by means of introspective infer-
ence, the mutual intention test must be treated as merely pi-ma
facie or presumptive, and must be supplemented by the principle
that a futures agreement entered into for the purpose of pro-
tecting a legitimate "long" or "short" interest, is valid. Un-
fortunately, only one statute has been found which creates such
an exception. Minnesota expressly validates "hedging agree-
ments." "'I Legislation aimed at gambling in futures has usu-
'o Falk -,. exander Mercantile Co., doupra note 99, at 27, 102 So. at 814.
The defendant, a merchant engaged in buying and selling cotton, sold the
plaintiff 400 bales of "spot" cotton (cotton actually on hand). Because
of a foreseeable delay in transporting the cotton to the New Orleans market,
the defendant agreed that the plaintiff should "sell" through the Ncw Or-
leans Cotton Exchange, 400 bales for future delivery and that the defend-
ant would "protect" him against any loss he might sustain on account
thereof. The plaintiff made the "sale" as agreed, and later closed it out,
by payment of the cash difference, at a loss, which he now seeks to recover
from defendant. The court inferred that this settlement was "in accord
-with the parties' original intention relative thereto," and affirmed a judg-
ment for defendant. The statute read, in part: "A contract for the pur-
chase or sale of a commodity of any kind, te be delivered at a future date,
the parties not intending that the commodity is to be actually delivered in
kind and the price paid, shall not be enforced by any court... ." Miss. Ax..
CODE (Hemingway, 1927) § 2034. See also Mackay Telegraph Cable Co. v.
Bain, supra note 94, where the court said that the Texas Penal Code (art.
536 and 539) prohibited hedging agreements, but held that the _Texas law
did not govern this transaction, which was valid apart from statute.
"0I MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 10223-3, declares that it is not illegal
for producer or dealer to enter into a contract for "future delivery on any
grain exchange, according to the customary method of making such contract
on such grain exchange; and if eithucr party ... enters into such contract
in good faith as a protection against loss ... such contract is ]awful, and
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ally, as in Mississippi, failed to discriminate between pure wager-
ing and the hedging of an extraneous interest.
Once the distinction between hedging and wagering is recog-
nized in legislative or judicial doctrine, the question will arise,
how can the courts discriminate between hedges and pure wag-
ers? What brands or earmarks can be used to separate the
sheep from the goats?
VI. THE INDICIA OF HEDGING AGREEMENTS
A. Burden of Proof and Judicial Notice
Except where a statute imposes the burden of proving the
legality of a futures agreement upon the party seeking to en-
force it,102 the party who asserts the illegality of the agree-
ment-in most cases the customer of a broker-ordinarily has
the burden of pleading and of proof.10 3 The weight of this bur-
den varies with judicial assumptions of fact and notions of
relevancy. Occasionally a court virtually takes judicial notice
that futures agreements on commodity exchanges are wagers
unless the contrary be shown.10 4 Fortunately such cases are
rare; even proof that the vast majority of exchange transactions
are made with no intention of delivery, is generally inadmissible
to prove that the litigated transaction falls within this class. " '
As a matter of persuasiveness such proof seems strictly
relevant; 100 its rejection must therefore be ascribed to considera-
mdy be carried out by delivery .. or may be settled by novation or by pay-
ment of the difference between contract price and market price. . . ." This
legislation frankly recognizes that a speculator (rather than another hedg-
er) is usually on the other end of a hedger's agreement, and that hedgers do
not intend, as a rule, to make (or take) delivery. It seems strange, how-
ever, that the statute of a great milling state does not clearly apply to
millers.
102 Pate v. Wilson Bros. Mercantile Co., 208 S. W. 235 (Tex. Civ. App.
1919).; Sprague v. Warren, supra note 51. The present Texas statute
omits this provision. TEXAS PENAL CODE (1928) art. 657-663.
103 Hooper v. Nuckles, supra note 59; Hyman & Co. v. Hay, Iilpatrick
v. Richter, both supra note 51; McCarthy Bros. Co. v. Equity Co-op. Ass'n
supra note 55; Browne v. Thorn, supra note 47. This rule is tacitly as-
sumed in many other cases. Where the contract is in terms of numbers
rather than quantities of a commodity, however, the presumption of
legality virtually disappears. Carey v. Myers, supra note 68.
14 Counselman v. Reichart, supra note 62; Lane v. Logan Grain Co.,
supra note 67 (common understanding that no delivery is intended on "puts"
and "calls") ; cf. McCarthy Bros. v. Equity Co-op. Ass'n, supra note 55.
'10 Lamson v. Turner, supra note 47; Roundtree v. Smith, 108 1. S. 276,
2 Sup. Ct. 630 (1883) (evidence insufficient to go to the jury) ; Gettys v.
Newburger, 272 Fed. 209 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921), certiorari denied, 257 V. S.
649, 42 Sup. Ct. 56 (1921), writ of error dismissed, 260 1. S. 693, 43 Sup.
Ct. 11 (1922).
106 Proof that less than one per cent of the transactions on the Chicago
Board of Trade are consummated by delivery tencTs to show (a) that this
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tions of policy. A similar explanation accounts for the infer-
ence, sometimes made, that this contract was entered into with
intent fo deliver because the rules of the exchange forbid the
making of agreements with a contrary intent.2'0 A "bucket-
shop" proprietor could not take advantage of such an
inference.'0 s
Evidence that other persons have made "futures" agreements
with the plaintiff with no intention of delivery would seem to
have some probative value; but it is perhaps too slight to justify.
its admission.,," Proof that previous similar agreements have
been consummated between the plaintiff and the defendant with-
out actual delivery seems clearly of the requisite probative value;
but it is not always admitted.1 " Such proof could frequently be
made by a "hedger" who used a particular broker solely for
hedges and sold his cash grain elsewhere. On the other hand,
proof that the customer had delivered grain (or taken delivery)
under previous futures transactions would clearly be admissible
to show that the broker was ignorant of the defendant's intention
as to the litigated transaction.,'
B. Occupation of Customer and His Ability to Make (or Take)
Delivery
The occupation of the customer and the disclosure of this fact
to the broker has been treated as an important fact in many
cases. Futures agreements have been held illegal where, to the
knowledge of the broker, the customer was a bank cashier of
transaction will not be consummated by delivery; (b) that the broker and
the customer, knowing this fact, did not "intend" to make delivery. Cf.
Russo v. Slawsby, 146 Atl. 508 (N. H. 1929); WiGMom, op. cit. supra
note 39, at 389.
107 Springs v. James, supra note 47 (rules of New York Cotton Ex-
change); Bell Co. v. Emberson, supra note 69 (rules of Milwaukee Cham-
ber of Commerce); Sampson v. Camperdown Mills, dupra note 69; Jacobs v.
Hyman, supra note 51; Cohen v. Rothschild, supra note 47. But cf.
Hyman & Co. v. Hay, supra note 51; Price v. Barnes, supra note 43.
108 Carey v. 21yers, supra, note 68 (bucket-shop proprietor posted notice
that "in buying, actual delivery is contemplated").
20 9Browne v. Thorn, 272 Fed. 950, 953 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921), aff'd, 260
U. S. 137, 43 Sup. Ct. 36 (1922).
210 Admitted: Carey v. Myers, supra note 68; Ohlendorf v. Bennett,
supra, note 52; Lamson v. West, supra note 67; Hartwig v. Booth, -?tpra
note 54; Fraser v. Farmer's Cooperative Co., 167 Blinn. 369, 209 N. W. 33
(1926). Excluded, or Held Insuffic c t to Raise an Issue of Fact; Lamn-on
v. Turner, Solomon v. Newberger, both supra note 47; Flowers v. Bush
and Witherspoon Co., supra note 70. See Dillon v. BMeCrea, 59 IIl. App.
505 (1895) (proper to charge jury that previous settlement in cash was
not "conclusive").
11 Lamson v. West, supra note 67; Hartwig v. Booth, supra note 51.
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limited means,'- or a druggist of small capital, 113 or a farmer
having no need for the commodity which he "purchased." 114
Farmers do not customarily hedge; 1 yet the farmer may on
occasion use the futures market for this purpose. Thus, in
Edgeley Co-operative Grain Co. v. Spitzer,'" a luckless farmer
who expected a rye crop of 12,000 bushels sold 10,000 bushels
for future delivery. His crop was less than expected, and the
price of rye mounted to the point where he closed out at a loss
of $4,000 on his futures. The court gave judgment against him,
saying that this was a hedging contract which protected him
against price decline on his expected crop, but adding incon-
sistently that the fact he expected 12,000 bushels from his crop
showed an intention to deliver under the futures contract. If
the futures contract was a hedge, he did not expect to make de-
livery under that contract.
Where the customer is a dealer in grain, buying and shipping
it, he has frequently been held liable on his futures contracts.,1
In the cases cited the court expressed its approval of hedging
agreements, and assumed that the litigated transactions were of
this character. In none of them, however, was it clearly shown
that the counter-interest of the customer was at least equal to
the amount of the hedge. These cases may, therefore, be taken
to show that the appropriate agreements of the typical hedger
will be enforced. In one case the court went somewhat further,
holding that a purchase of futures by a local elevator associa-
tion, though not a typical hedge, was enforceable because it
might have been made to close out a sale (a proper hedge, in
this case) assumed to have been previously made through an-
other broker.",
But in several cases a grain dealer has successfully evaded
performance of his futures contracts.'" Two of these cases are
U2 Ohlendorf v. Bennett, supra note 52 (suit by bank receiver against
broker).
u3 Hartwig v. Booth, supra note 54.
'4 Carey v. Myers, supra note 68 (farmer "bought" 1,000 barrels of
pork) ; Price v. Barnes, m*pra note 43; Hyman & Co. v. Hay, supra note 51.
'I' HEARINGS ON S. 454, 26, 28.
- Supra note 59. But in Kilpatrick v. Richter, supra note 51, a farmer
who sold cotton by a memorandum stating that it represented a part of
his crop was allowed, on his own testimony that it was a wager, to defeat
recovery for breach of his contract.
= Bell v. Emberson, supra note 69; Miller Co. v. Klovstad, Lamson v.
Turner, both supra note 47; McCarthy Bros. v. Equity Co-op. Ass'n, supra
note 55; of. Mackay Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Bain, supra note 94; Pixley v.
Boynton, supra note 47 (plaintiff a grain shipper); Sampson v. Camper-
down Cotton Mills, supra note 69 (defendant a cotton manufacturer).
118 McCarthy Bros. v. Equity Co-op. Ass'n, mspra note 55.
119 Falk v. Alexander Mercantile Co., supra note 99; State v. Clayton,
supra note 61; Lamson v. Vest, supra note 67; Fraser v. Farmer's Co-oper-
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to be explained on the ground that a statute made the mutual
intention test conclusive and hence hedging was irralevant.'2
The Illinois case -1 reveals a suspicious disproportion between
the futures transactions and the legitimate interests to be pro-
tected. A small-town farmer and grain dealer, owning two
elevators having a joint capacity of 35,000 bushels (as the brok-
er's agent knew), during a period of nine months engaged in
157 futures transactions aggregating 1,700,000 bushels. The
particular transaction in litigation was a "sale" of 100,000 bush-
els, on which a loss of $7,000 was sustained. 'While the opinion
does not mention hedging as a possible explanation, and in fact
treats the mutual intention test as conclusive under the Illinois
statute, the decision is compatible with the legality of proper
hedging agreements. For even if due allowance be made for a
rapid turnover of "cash" grain, it seems highly improbable that
the operation of this small elevator would entail such extensive
futures commitments as a protection of legitimate interests. The
case is illustrative of the factors to be considered in drawing the
line between hedging and wagering by small grain dealers.
The two Minnesota cases draw a closer line around legitimate
hedging. In one case'122 the defendant, a local elevator com-
pany, bought 20,000 bushels of May oats in October, though
there was no substantial evidence that it had any stored oats at
the time. The court thought it suspicious that this transaction,
if it were a hedge, was not closed out until the following April,
long after the "returns would have been made or the stored oats
shipped out." If this indicates that a transaction, originally a
hedge to cover a legitimate interest, becomes a wager as soon as
the legitimate interest is disposed of, a very strict rule indeed
is laid down, and one which makes hedging by present methods
impracticable. As soon as this transaction was closed in April,
the defendant, having 9,406 bushels of stored oats "in transit,"
"bought" 12,000 bushels of July oats through the plaintiff. Ap-
parently the effect of shipping the oats of its depositors as its
own was to make the defendant liable for the price prevailing
ative Co., supra note 110; Bolfing v. Schoener, 144 Blinn. 425, 175 N. W.
901 (1920); Benson-Stabeck Co. v. Reservation Farmers' Grain Co., mspra
note 67.20 Falk v. Alexander Mercantile Co., supra note 99; State v. Clayton,
supra note 61. In the latter case a dealer in pork, to protect his interest
in contracts whereby he contracted to sell pork to various customers for
actual delivery, purchased pork futures on margin. The jury found spe-
cially that there was to be no actual delivery under the futures agreement,
and the dealer was convicted of violating a penal statute which made "in-
tention to deliver" the conclusive test. The court assumed a liberal atti-
tude toward hedging but felt concluded by the jury's verdict
-1 Lamson v. West, supra note 67.
12 Fraser v. Farmer's Cooperative Co., supra note 110.
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when the depositors demanded their grain; hence a purchase of
futures was made as a hedge against this fluctuating liability.123
The court remarked that "no explanation is made as to why the
future trade should involve an excess of 3,500 [2,500] bushels."
On this evidence the court, "with some reluctance," upheld a
verdict for the defendant. The opinion indicates a failure to
understand that the hedging transaction is not, in purpose or
practical use, a transaction for the actual transfer of grain:
"Hedging is a legitimate transaction. . . .But contracts in
form for future delivery, not intended to represent actual trans-
actions, but merely to pay and receive the differences between
the agreed price and the market price at a future day, are in
the nature of wagers on the future price of the commodity, and
are void. Dun. Dig. § 10133." 124
A clearer understanding of the hedging transaction is mani-
fested in the earlier Minnesota case of Bolting 'v. Schoener,15
a suit by the personal representative of a deceased customer to
cancel a mortgage given to a broker for losses on futures trans-
actions. The judgment of the trial court, that the mortgage be
cancelled, was affirmed. The appellate court recognized that
hedging transactions, entered into with no intention of delivery,
are legitimate:
"There is no pretense that the passing of actual grain was
ever contemplated in any of these option deals. They were to be
settled by paying or receiving the amount of the rise or fall in
the market price of the grain and were clearly illegal unless jziti-
flable as "hedges.' 12
But the court found, on the following evidence, that some, at
least, of these transactions were not hedges: (1) Some trans-
actions originated in a purchase rather than a sale of futures;
(2) six transactions were closed out in July and August, 1916,
when the customer, a small elevator proprietor, had bought little,
if any, grain, and hence had no interest to protect; (3) even if
the customer bought September (1917) wheat to close out a pre-
vious unprofitable sale of July (1917) wheat, he was speculat-
ing rather than hedging; (4) the sale of July wheat was made
in January, 1917, while the purchase of September wheat was
not made until the end of March, 1917, "long after any legiti-
mate hedge made in January ought to have been closed out;"
123 This type of hedging, used by Northwestern elevators of small capac-
ity, is described in (1920) 1 GRAIN TRADE 226.
124 16T Minn. at 377, 209 N. W. at 37.
125 Supra note 119.
126 144 Minn. at 426, 175 N. W. at 901 (italics ours). A similar statement
is made ibid- 430, 175 N. W. at 903. Yet elsewhere the opinion reads: "For
present purposes we shall assume without deciding that 'hedging' trans-
actions are lawful. . . ." Ibid. 427, 175 N. W. at 902.
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(5) in January, February, Mlarch and April, 1917, the customer
shipped only about 8,400 bushels of grain, yet he closed out
options for 39,000 bushels; (6) the customer gave "stop-loss
orders" -7 on some transactions.
The decision can be sustained on the fifth point, since the dis-
proportion between the futures and cash transactions indicates
that the bounds of legitimate hedging were overstepped; yet
one is troubled somewhat by the absence of evidence showing that
this disproportion was known to the broker. The other points
are highly doubtful. The first is valid only if the purchases
were not made to close out hedging- sales; it is here assumed
they were not. 28 The court recognizes that there may be situa-
tions in which a local elevator will legitimately hedge by pur-
chasing, -129 but says there is no evidence of such a situation here.
As to the second point, if the customer sold and then closed out
before he had any cash interest to protect, it was not hedging.
But the question may be raised, would it not be legitimate hedg-
ing for an elevator to sell in advance of receipt of grain actually
anticipated? The analogy of insurance law, that one may in-
sure property which one actually expects to acquire in the fu-
ture,ao would seem pertinent here. The third point seems to
put a needless limitation on hedging since the September pur-
chase was, in effect, a hedge against the July sale, which was a
legitimate hedge and therefore a legitimate interest to be pro-
tected. The fourth point is clearly unsound, not only because
the average life of hedging transactions is thirty to forty days,
but also because the practice of using one sale to cover several
successive purchases and shipments of cash grain cuts don the
cost of hedging and is, therefore, to be encouraged.13'
In contrast with the United States District Court for Montana,
which presumed that futures transactions of a vocational hedger
were legitimate, 32 the Supreme Court of the same state adopted
a "strict hedging" test in Benson Stabcck Co. v. Rcscration
Farmers' Gr in Co.133 A member of the Minneapolis Chamber
of Commerce, a well-established grain exchange, sued a Mon-
tana elevator company on notes given for losses on futures trans-
127 ... . . gave an order for the purchase or sale of an option, and at the
same time directed that it should be closed out whenever the market rose
or fell a certain amount." Ibid. 430, 175 N. W. at 903.
12s Contrast McCarthy Bros. v. Equity Co-op Ass'n, stpra note 55, where
the opposite assumption was made. The court said the broker might have
thought the purchase was made to close out a sale ("hedge") made through
another broker.
912 See supra note 123.
130 VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 143.
'131 (1926) 7 GiuN TRADE 63.
132See supra note 128.
133 Supra note 67.
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actions which the defendant claimed to have been illegal. A ver-
dict and judgment for the defendant were affirmed. The court
found sufficient evidence (for the jury) of a disclosed intention
not to deliver, in three bits of evidence: (1) Of ninety-nine
sales, made in August, of May futures, three were made on
"stop-loss" orders, contrary to the rules of the Chamber of Com-
merce. A "stop-loss" order is inconsistent with strict hedging,
since the strict hedger should close out his futures transaction
when he delivers his cash grain, rather than when the market
price reaches a certain point. (2) The plaintiff obligingly
"scalped" for the defendant in order to save a loss on a sale of
futures. "Scalping" is purchasing and selling on the same day,
and is rarely, if ever, compatible with strict hedging. (3) The
plaintiff advised the defendant to sell out a purchase of Decem-
ber wheat in order to avoid having to take delivery. Just why
the defendant was "long" on wheat is not clear, but if the eleva-
tor company were selling stored grain a purchase of futures
would be a proper hedge, and the fact that the defendant was
reluctant to take delivery on such a transaction would not be in-
compatible with strict hedging. The court approves hedging
transactions but by adopting the mutual intention test it prac-
tically outlaws genuine hedging, even strict hedging. The case
shows the difficulty of separating the strict hedging transactions
of a vocational hedger from his speculative transactions; it also
shows the harsh results of the rule that a few illegal transac-
tions will vitiate an entire cause of action, including many legiti-
mate transactions.
In endeavoring to distinguish hedging from wagering, the
courts are between the devil and the deep sea. On the one
hand, the grain broker who, even though he actually executed
the orders on recognized exchanges, participates in, or encour-
ages, reckless wagering by the manager or directors of a local
elevator company on the company's credit, may properly be
denied recovery of losses thus incurred. On the other hand,
either the mutual intention test or the strict hedging test, when
applied to a series of complicated transactions, will penalize a
broker who furnishes a useful service.
A via media can be found by using the "vocational hedging"
test, limited by a "disproportion" test. That is, all futures trans-
actions by persons (including corporations) whose business in-
volves actual handling of cash grain should be treated as pre-
sumptively valid, even though made with a mutual intention not
to deliver. This presumption would be overcome by proof that,
to the knowledge of the broker, the hedger had engaged in
futures transactions far in excess of his normal requirements for
hedging purposes. 34 The degree of permissible disproportion
134 E.g., Lamson v. West, supra note 67. For example, the by-lawg of a
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can be marked out by a series of concrete decisions.
On the other hand, to wield the bludgeon of nullity whenever
the limits of strict hedging are passed would be to outlaw many,
perhaps most, transactions actually used for hedging purposes.
We are confronted with an institution, not a theory. Many fac-
tors make strict hedging difficult if not unworkable. For ex-
ample, "on most of the exchanges trading in futures is in 1,000
bushel lots as a minimum." 133 Hedging transactions are often
made in anticipation of cash grain which will be delivered later.13 "
Frequently one hedging transaction is allowed to stand as pro-
tection on several cash purchases. Cash wheat of a certain
grade may be hedged in wheat of one or of many other grades,
and barley and lye, with limited futures markets, are often
hedged in wheat.137  Moreover, successful hedging requires the
exercise of business judgment as to favorable market conditions.
Once a hedge is made the hedger is likely to exercise his judg-
ment as to the best time to close it out, just as an ordinary specu-
lator would do. Hence "spreading," "stop-loss" orders and even
"scalping" should not per se be regarded as incompatible with
vocational hedging. If, as is essential, hedging enables the small
operator or miller to protect himself against ruin, and to finance
his dealings in cash grain on a small capital,sS the actual prac-
tice of hedging should be given judicial sanction.
VII. SOME UNANSWvERED QUESTIONS
In order to make clear the implications of the foregoing discus-
sion, it must be noted that the following questions are avowedly
left unanswered:
(1) The extent to which organized exchanges are socially use-
ful institutions apart from their use by hedgers. They are pub-
lic registers of grain prices, and there is considerable evidence
that fluctuations in prices have become less violent since they
came into being. That they also help in the movement from
soil to consumer seems plausible.
(2) The extent to which a beneficent government may prop-
erly allow its citizens respectable methods of gratifying their
appetites for gambling. The organized exchanges, as super-
St. Louis flour mill gave the manager a leeway of 35,000 bushels, the extent
to which the mill may be "long" or "short" at any one tim. (1926) 7
GRAiN TRADE 56.
135 (1920) 1 GimIN TRADE (Country Grain Marketing) 212. On the
Chicago Board of Trade, the minimum is 5,000 bushels, except in job lots.
136Ibid. Or, in the case of exporters, in anticipation of cash grain to
be sold. (1926) 7 ibid. 49.
137 Ibid. 213.
138 (1926) 7 G~rniN TRADE 279. 0
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vised under recent federal legislation, seem to afford honest
machinery for speculation. 39
(3) The extent to which speculation by the uninitiated, as
distinguished from the professional operator, is indispensable to
the maintenance of a broad market. Off-hand it would seem that
the inexperienced speculators tend to upset the market rather
than stabilize it.
(4) The legal machinery by which speculation on produce ex-
changes is to be kept within limits. The civil penalty (denial of
recovery on the contract) is a blunderbuss remedy, yet it has the
advantage of not requiring a host of administrative officials for
its enforcement. While there is a distinct tendency to throw
over the mutual intention test, for the present that test is "a
political necessity though an economic impossibility." Some
brake upon futures trading by the lunatic fringe seems needed,
and the broker who solicits the uninitiated to take a "flyer in the
market" is hit hardest by the mutual intention test.14
(5) The way in which the mutual intention test can be so
shaped as to legitimize trades by or for the professional opera-
tor, who seems to be an indispensable factor in the maintenance
of a broad and stable market. Logically, there is no way. Prac-
tically, the professional operator, one may conjecture from the
reported cases, is not the man to contest his legal liability. Cus-
tom conquers the law. 41
139 Ibid. 291: "The distinction between the gambler and the speculator
is principally a matter of degree of knowledge." "There is another very
important qualification for speculation. This point is emphasized-over-
emphasized, in fact-in the view that all that is necessary is that the specu-
lator be financially responsible .... Responsibility, however, is not a mat-
ter of the size of the customer, but of the ratio of the trades carried by a
speculator to his available resources." Prof. Irving Fisher emphasizes
the element of expertness. HARDY, READINGS IN RISK AND RIsK-BEARING
(1924) 347.
140 "The simplest and best rule is that speculative trade should in no
case be really solicited." (1926) 7 GRAIN TRADE 299. In an earlier volume of
the report, however, the criticism of James v. Clement, supra. note 51, fails
to note that the order in that case was solicited. In Clark v. McNeil, testi-
mony was given that the broker's branch office in Hickman, Ky., "was all the
time trying to get people to give John F. Clark & Co. their business....
Men, women, and children and babies dealt in cotton over there and in
all transactions that they had there was not an actual delivery of any
commodity." 25 F. (2d) at 249. In fairness it must be pointed out that
the Chicago Board of Trade is trying to curb solicitation, e.g., by limita-
tions on radio broadcasting (RuLES (1930) § 1044) and by requiring
solicitors (for members) to work on a fixed salary (ibid. § 1600).
141 This statement must, however, be accepted with caution, since the
reports do not always disclose the vocation of the customer, much less his
expertness in market operations. Though the occupation of the customer
is treated as significant in judicial opinions, no case has been found in
which a "typical" professional speculator has raised the defense of illegality.
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(6) The way in which the speculator on the other end of a
hedging transaction may be treated as a legitimate indemnitor-
a socially useful risk-bearer-rather than a wagerer. Practi-
cally, there seems to be no way, since the exchange member
lumps orders together in trading on the exchange, and a trade
by one non-member through the exchange cannot be allocated to
a non-member at the other end of the chain.
I VIII. HEDGING AS PRICE INSURANCE
The statement that hedging is "price insurance" is frequently
made as a justification of the existence of organized exchanges
and of trading in futures, especially the much denounced "short"
sale.142  The accuracy of this statement may be examined, first
because of its bearing upon the problem of "strict" or "loose"
hedging, and secondly, because of the possibility of devising an
adequate form of insurance to serve the same purpose as hedg-
ing without the evils of exchange gambling.
The Federal Trade Commission report distinguishes hedging
from insurance:
"The future contract used in hedging is not an insurance con-
tract in any proper sense, even if it serves a somewhat similar
purpose. There is no specific premium paid for specified pro-
tection. The hedger gives up gains as well as avoids losses.
Insurance avails itself of the theory of probabilities, in its prac-
tical application to averages, with the result of broadly dis-
tributing nearly certain aggregate losses, but the direct effect of
the hedge is merely to transfer a loss or a gain, and such losses
or gains are often markedly concentrated."
The distinction is not made as clear as one might wish. The
The Federal Trade Commission's study of the occupations of 5,000 customers
of eight Chicago "wire" houses (commission houses executing exchange
transactions on telegraphic orders) indicated that sixty-three per cent of
the customers were in the "trade" group; but the inquiry was unable to
separate "hedgers" from speculators, nor did it reveal the "expertness" of
the speculators, though the conclusion is reached: "Such a tendency ...
indicates that attraction to trading in futures depends partly upon expe-
rience in mercantile matters, such as would to some degree, though not
very directly, prepare a person for speculation." (1926) 7 GRAIN TRADE
199.
142 ".. hedging is a manufacturer's or merchant's insurance against
price fluctuation of materials, and no more damnatory than insurances of
property and life, which in one sense are wagers that the property will not
be destroyed during the term, and that the life wil not fail in less than
the expectancy in the actuaries' tables." Baker, J., in Board of Trade v.
Kinsey Co., 130 Fed. 507, 512 (C. C. A. 7th, 1904). Most "hedges" are
"sales" of futures, because the volume of hedging by elevators is larger
than that by millers. For a discussion of hedging as insurance, see the
colloquy in HEARINGS O.N S. 454, 29.
143 (1926) 7 GRAIN TRADE 65.
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losses by fire, for instance, are "markedly concentrated," since
only a small proportion of those insured against fire suffer loss
by fire at all. Apparently "concentrated" means "concentrated
in time" rather than concentrated upon a small number of those
exposed to the risk at any one time. A sudden and violent down-
ward turn of the market will cause heavy losses to all unhedged
holders of cash grain, just as a sudden upward turn will bring
them unforeseen profits. If such sudden and violent downward
turns occur, let us say, once every two years, then the "insurer"
who assumes such a risk is in the position of a fire insurer who
insures all the buildings in a town where a general conflagration
is bound to occur every two years and cause serious loss to all
his insured. 144  The cash premium for such insurance would be
so high that no hedger would be willing to pay it in cash. A
genuine insurance scheme works successfully only if the risk
assumed is such that only a few of those exposed to it will ac-
tually suffer the loss.145
Since the hedger will not pay his "premium" in cash, he pays
it by foregoing his gains on a rising market (to continue the
illustration of the elevator-hedger). This brings the "insurer"
in as a participator in the enterprise, a situation which is in-
compatible with the analogy of insurance. To deduct a fixed
premium from gross profit (as the insured does in shifting his
fire risk) is quite a different matter from turning over to the
risk-taker an unpredetermined portion of the possible profits of
the enterprise. Hence hedging does not fit the Procrustean bed.
As has already been pointed out, the successful operation of
"hedging" in grain requires a stable relation between the price
of cash grain and of futures.14  Such conditions frequently do
not exist.147 The holder of cash grain who wishes protection
144 The hedger may seek protection against minor fluctuations in the
market, which also cause loss to all exposed to the risk. On the principle
of averages, downward fluctuations occur about half the time. Hence it
has been suggested that hedging is unnecessary for minor fluctuations,
which will average out. Hedging has relation primarily to extendcd price
trends.
145 Rxi AnDs, INsuRANcs LAW (3d ed. 1909) 2.
'16 (1926) 7 GRAiN TRAnE 64.
S47After a thorough study of the results of "hedging" on the New York
Cotton Exchange, Mr. Reaviss Cox, Market Editor of The Journal of
Commerce (New York), concluded that spot cotton and futures do not
move up and down concurrently, that "the individual's risk when he is
hedged is from one-eighth to two-thirds as great as it would have been
had he not been hedged," that hedging "involves dangers peculiar to itself,
*so that it is an instrument to be used with all possible skill and care," and
that the cotton merchant's only benefit from hedging is that he can operate
on a smaller capital. Reavis Cox, Hedging Cotton, The Journal of Com-




against decline cannot get a contract of indemnity from a re-
sponsible risk-bearer; he must utilize a device which at times
affords very imperfect indemnity; and he must use his business
judgment in deciding when to hedge and when not to hedge. In
so doing he becomes again, a speculator, and should not be held
too strictly to a theory of pure indemnity. The hedging agree-
ment is more nearly analogous to life insurance than to fire
insurance; and in applying the law of wagering to the former,
the courts do not exact strict indemnity but administer a "rough
working rule" which tends to minimize frenzied wagering-14 A
similar working rule is that advocated above for hedging
agreements.
The foregoing considerations indicate that the substitution of
price insurance for hedging on produce exchanges could not be
accomplished simply by transferring to an insurance company
the hedging agreements now made by speculators. A wholly
new type of insurance would have to be devised. Since one
primary object of those who favor such a substitution is the
abolition of futures trading (or at least, "short selling") on or-
ganized exchanges, the insurance plan must be worked out on the
assumption that trading in futures on organized exchanges does
not exist. To estimate the premium, and to devise a contractual
definition of the risk assumed, in the absence of a market for
futures at least as continuous and stable as the present exchanges
offer, would call for a degree of sagacity and skill not exhibited by
any heretofore successful insurance enterprise. If, to obviate
some of these difficulties, the price insurer should agree to take
over the insured's unprofitable contracts (a plan analogous to
that once embodied in credit insurance contracts 114) or should
agree to buy the produce from the insured (or sell to him, in
the case of a miller), the insurer could hardly avoid becoming
a grain dealer on a large scale. If, on the other hand, it be as-
sumed that organized exchanges are to continue in operation,
price insurance would probably be more costly than, and hence
unable to compete with, the hedging facilities offered by those
exchanges. To supplant the hedging agreement by a private
insurance contract seems highly impracticable.
148 See Patterson, insurablo Interest in Life (1918) 18 COL. L. lIsE. 381.
249 Credit insurance contracts were formerly made in the form of an
agreement by the insurer to purchase at their face amount all uncol-
lectible debts over a named percentage of the insured's total annual credit
transactions. HARDY, RISK AND RISE-BEARING (1923) 324; WOLFE, Paix-
CIPLES OF PROPERTY INSURNCE (1930) c. X-I. This form of credit in-
surance, however, has been supplanted by one in which the risk is defined
in terms of specific facts indicating insolvency. Hanna, Credit hliuzancc
(1931) 79 U. of PA. L. REv. 521, 527. While the credit insurer still col-
lects the insured's bad credits, this salvage service is hardly comparable to
the buying and selling of produce.
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Hedging agreements will continue to be used. Courts and
legislatures should seek to make them feasible. The following
suggestions are offered with this end in view:
(1) "Mutual intention to deliver" as a test of wagering in
futures should be a prima facie rather than a conclusive test of
illegality. Statutes which make it a conclusive test should be
modified by some such provision as that adopted in Minnesota.
(2) The legality of hedging agreements made with no inten-
tion that delivery of the commodity shall actually occur, should
be avowedly recognized.
(3) The inevitability of a limited amount of speculation by
those engaged in hedging legitimate interests should be recog-
nized and futures transactions by vocational hedgers on reput-
able produce exchanges should be presumptively valid.
(4) The responsibility of preventing obviously excessive spec-
ulation by vocational hedgers may, in view of present legisla-
tive policy, be placed on the shoulders of the broker or commis-
sion firm in so far as the denial of civil liability of the hedger
will accomplish this end.
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